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ABSTRACT 
Over the past 50 years, campus violence has significantly impacted our 
institutions of higher education. As a result, campus safety has become an increasingly 
important topic for all colleges and universities. The Virginia Tech tragedy in 2007 
highlighted the necessity of emergency management planning and training as well as 
employee understanding of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).  
Emergency management plans for 27 institutions in Missouri were collected and 
evaluated to determine how they instructed employees to respond to various campus 
safety scenarios and how training factored into the campus plans. Two-hundred, fifty-one 
employees were then surveyed to see how consistently and accurately they responded to 
two campus safety scenarios, based on the instructions given in their particular campus 
plans. Employee understanding of FERPA was also reviewed to identify how well 
administrators, faculty, and staff comprehend student privacy regulations. 
The following conclusions were established as a result of this study. (a) While 
most institutions have emergency management plans in place, these plans are not well 
read or understood. (b) Many emergency management plans are not comprehensive and 
are inconsistent across the state of Missouri. (c) Minimal participation in annual training 
as part of emergency management planning occurs at our public higher education 
institutions in Missouri, especially for faculty. (d) Participation in training does not 
indicate that an institution is better prepared to respond to campus safety incidents.  
(e) Employees do not understand what information may be shared under FERPA as well 
as what information is not subject to FERPA regulations. (f) Some institutions, and some 
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individuals, are hesitant to discuss or evaluate emergency preparedness in response to 
campus safety incidents.  
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
“Knowing what to do when faced with a crisis can be the difference between calm 
and chaos, between courage and fear, between life and death” (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2007, p. 1-2). This statement from the introduction to the U.S. Department of 
Education‟s Practical Information for Crisis Planning reminds us that campus violence is 
a reality for institutions of higher education. The days of feeling completely safe and 
secure while attending a college or university no longer exist. Although some individuals 
still regard higher education institutions as safe havens where nothing bad can happen, 
the events of recent years are reminders that our postsecondary institutions must be 
prepared for the unthinkable. Colleges and universities must be ready to respond to 
incidents of campus violence to ensure the safety of the campus community.  
As illustrations of this reality, a number of campus shootings have occurred over 
the past 50 years. The University of Texas clock tower attack by former student Charles 
Whitman in August of 1966 was considered the nation‟s worst mass shooting up to that 
time. A total of 16 people were killed, and another 31 wounded when Mr. Whitman fired 
a rifle from the University of Texas-Austin clock tower (Roberts, 2007). Forty-one years 
later, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) tragedy 
became the nation‟s worst mass shooting in April of 2007. Seung Hui Cho, an 
undergraduate student majoring in English, killed 32 students and faculty, wounded 17 
additional people, and then killed himself (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Despite 
these horrific events, the Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) indicated that “Shootings  
at universities are rare events, an average of about 16 a year across 4,000 institutions”  
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(p. 18). Yet 16 shootings annually is hardly an acceptable safety record for higher 
education and is one that would shock and shame any other developed nation. 
The Virginia Tech tragedy brought to light a number of concerns related to 
campus safety and emergency preparedness, including concerns about comprehensive 
training for faculty, staff, and students and adherence to privacy laws. The Virginia Tech 
Review Panel (2007) recommended that training on all types of emergencies be 
conducted annually for all faculty, staff, and students. In addition, the Panel expressed 
concern about the lack of understanding of privacy laws and the inconsistent practice 
when applying privacy laws to college and university security situations. 
As a result of incidents like those cited above, most institutions have a 
comprehensive emergency management plan in place, which will be referred to in this 
study as an all-hazards emergency management plan. One of the most important 
components of an all-hazards emergency management plan is training. In the Action 
Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education, the U.S. 
Department of Education (2009) stated the following: 
The more the plan is practiced and people are trained on the plan, the better the 
campus responds to emergencies in a comprehensive and effective 
manner….Exercises are an effective way to identify gaps and weaknesses in the 
plan and to train students, staff, faculty, and campus administrators in the 
emergency management procedures. (p. 51)  
Although it is important to have a comprehensive plan that covers all hazards, the focus 
of this research study is campus violence, which is only one component of an all-hazards 
emergency management plan. 
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Federal laws, such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 
play a significant role in how administrators, faculty, and staff can plan for and respond 
to incidents that may impact campus safety. If suspicious behavior occurs, college 
personnel may be forced into a dilemma concerning student right to privacy and 
institutional right to safety. The Ripple Effect of Virginia Tech (2008) indicated “The 
Virginia Tech tragedy brought into the spotlight the often difficult task of balancing 
individual privacy rights with the need to communicate with appropriate authorities when 
a student exhibits disturbing or threatening behavior” (Midwestern Higher Education 
Compact, p. 13). When faculty and staff are unclear as to how to interpret federal 
regulations, institutions of higher education may be at risk.   
Purpose of the Study 
This research study examined the relationship between active faculty/staff 
participation in training exercises as part of implementation of an all-hazards emergency 
management plan and the consistency and accuracy of response to potential campus 
safety incidents in higher education. The research also reviewed the relationship between 
implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff 
participation in training exercises and knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding 
to potential campus safety incidents in higher education.  
The purpose of this study was to provide research that allows colleges and 
universities to determine if training is effective, and if employees who say they have been 
trained actually indicate that they know the institution‟s emergency management plan and 
would respond appropriately when presented with potential campus safety incidents. The 
findings of this study reform the discussion related to the effectiveness of planning and 
training in preparing a college community for a violent situation.  
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Statement of the Problem 
Virtually everyone working in higher education today is aware of the potentiality 
of a violent campus incident, and most institutions now have an all-hazards emergency 
management plan in place. Yet little research has been performed that examines the 
amount of training college employees receive related to the plans, the degree of 
understanding faculty and staff have of the requirements of the plans, and the consistency 
with which they are understood across campus. Since a plan is no better than an 
institution‟s ability to implement it, a plan that is poorly or inconsistently understood will 
have limited value in case of a campus emergency. Research is critically needed to 
determine how well the myriad of all-hazards emergency management plans have been 
assimilated into the culture of the institutions they are designed to protect.    
Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses guided this research and directed the methodology 
employed to acquire and analyze data: 
Hypothesis #1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will respond more consistently to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. 
Hypothesis #2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will respond more accurately to potential campus 
safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards 
emergency management plan that does not include training. 
Hypothesis #3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will have more knowledge of FERPA regulations 
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when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education 
institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include 
training. 
Hypothesis #4: There will be more consistency in response to potential campus safety 
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when 
the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than 
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include 
training. 
Hypothesis #5: There will be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to 
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher 
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management 
plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management 
plans that do not include training. 
Hypothesis #6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will 
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-
administrative positions. 
Scope of the Study 
 
 A quantitative methodology was employed as a means for both gathering and 
analyzing data for this study. Two campus safety incident scenarios were presented to a 
group of selected employees at public college campuses in the State of Missouri, 
followed by a series of closed-ended questions. The sample population included 
presidents, chief academic officers, deans of student services/student affairs, registrars, 
full-time faculty members, public safety directors/chiefs of police, public safety officers, 
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health/mental health professionals, human resource directors, housing directors, and the 
emergency preparedness contact person at each college or university.   
The following were delimitations of this research study: 
1. This research study was limited to public institutions of higher education in 
Missouri. 
2. The sample population was limited to the personnel in colleges and universities 
selected by the researcher listed above. While others may well be involved in 
implementing the plan, this group, by nature of their positions, was seen as critical 
to effective execution.   
3. Students and adjunct faculty were not included in the sample. Their understanding 
of the emergency management plan may be important in a number of ways, but 
the focus of this research was on full-time personnel. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited by several factors that are indicative of characteristics of 
both the nature of the study and the institutions involved. Some institutions, especially 
community colleges, did not have all participant positions, including health/mental health 
professional, housing director, and public safety departments. Additionally, two of the 
two-year institutions are part of community college districts and have district 
coordinators for the Human Resources and Registrar departments. Two institutions also 
did not specifically identify an emergency preparedness contact person, but utilize a 
group of individuals to serve in this capacity. In these cases, there were not comparable 
responses from each institution.  
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The study was further limited by the fact that some institutions did not provide 
emergency management plans, and by the vast differences among plans in terms of 
completeness. This finding is important to the study because in some cases, it did limit 
the ability of the model to compare responses by participants to statements in their 
institutional plans. 
The researcher does not, however, see these potential limitations as seriously 
compromising the study since response rates were sufficient from community colleges, 
and very few institutions did not have or did not provide emergency management plans.  
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions were utilized for important terms and concepts used in 
this study to insure clarity and understanding. Some of these definitions are provided to 
describe how the researcher used them, specifically in terms of this study. 
Accuracy of Response: How accurately higher education personnel respond to personal 
and institutional questions following two campus safety incident scenarios that are 
presented, based on the institution‟s all-hazards emergency management plan. 
Administrator: Full-time employees at public institutions of higher education, including 
the following positions: president, chief academic officer, and dean of student 
services/student affairs. 
All-Hazards Emergency Management Plan: A plan that “develops capacities and 
capabilities that are critical to prepare for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters, 
including natural hazards and severe weather, biological hazards, and violence and 
terrorism” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 4). 
Campus Violence: “An event, often sudden or unexpected, that disrupts the normal 
operations of the institution or its educational mission and threatens the well-being of 
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personnel, property, financial resources, and/or reputation of the institution” (Zdziarski, 
2006, p. 5). 
Consistency of Response: How similarly higher education personnel respond to personal 
and institutional questions following two campus safety incident scenarios that are 
presented, based on the institution‟s all-hazards emergency management plan. 
Faculty: Full-time instructors at public institutions of higher education. 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA): “A federal law that protects the 
privacy of students‟ „education records‟….FERPA applies to educational agencies and 
institutions that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Department of 
Education” (U.S. Department of Education/U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2008, p. 1). 
Knowledge of FERPA Regulations: The appropriate response to questions concerning 
FERPA. 
Mitigation: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that involves “the 
action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property 
damage related to an event or crisis, particularly those that cannot be prevented”  
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 7). 
Preparedness: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that “designs 
strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for potential 
emergencies” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 9). 
Prevention: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that involves 
“the action colleges and universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis 
will occur” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 7). 
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Recovery: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that “establishes 
procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members‟ return to 
functioning after an emergency” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 14). 
Response: The phase in institutional emergency management planning that involves 
“taking action to effectively contain and resolve an emergency” (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2009, p. 12). 
Staff: Full-time employees at public institutions of higher education, including the 
following positions: registrar, public safety director/chief of police, public safety officer, 
health/mental health professional, human resource director, housing director, and 
emergency preparedness contact person. 
Training: Participation in annual training related to campus violence at the institutional 
level. 
Training Exercises: Orientation meetings, tabletop exercises, drills, functional exercises, 
and/or full-scale exercises (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
Significance of the Study 
Campus violence is a topic that is familiar to all. Whether a loved one has been 
lost or the impact of a tragedy has been felt from miles away, campus violence is a reality 
for all Americans. For the safety of faculty, staff, and students, institutions of higher 
education must be proactive in preparing for potential incidents of campus violence. This 
study researched the importance of having an all-hazards emergency management plan in 
place which is supplemented by regular training exercises for all faculty and staff. Its 
findings reform the discussion related to the effectiveness of planning and training in 
preparing a college community for a violent situation. Additionally, the importance of 
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understanding FERPA regulations was reviewed, and the study determined how well 
informed the participant community is about these important regulations. 
When this research study was undertaken, it was determined that if the results of 
this research study indicated there was a significant relationship between implementation 
of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff participation in 
training exercises and (a) consistency of response to potential campus safety incidents 
within an institution, (b) accuracy of response to potential campus safety incidents within 
an institution, and (c) knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential 
campus safety incidents within an institution, then colleges and universities should 
commence and/or update training exercises at their respective institutions as soon as 
possible. All faculty and staff should be required to participate in training exercises.  
If the results did not indicate a significant relationship between implementation of 
an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff participation in 
training exercises and consistency of response, accuracy of response, and knowledge of 
FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents within an 
institution, then further research should be conducted to determine what influences 
consistency and accuracy of response and knowledge of FERPA regulations within 
higher education institutions and how training and institutional responsiveness can be 
made more effective. 
Additionally, it was determined that if the results indicated there was a significant 
relationship between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that 
includes faculty/staff participation in training exercises and consistency of response to 
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher 
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education institutions and knowledge of FERPA regulations, but a clear difference in 
levels of knowledge and understanding between positions, then colleges and universities 
should commence and/or update training exercises at their respective institutions as soon 
as possible. All faculty and staff should be required to participate in these training 
exercises. If the results of this research study indicated there was not a significant 
relationship between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that 
includes faculty/staff participation in training exercises and these two factors, then further 
research should be conducted to determine what influences consistency of response and 
knowledge of FERPA regulations among personnel in similar positions at various higher 
education institutions. 
The same can be said of accuracy of response. After conducting this study, if 
personnel in similar positions responded more accurately than others, training must be 
revised to increase levels of understanding for those groups who demonstrated lower 
levels of knowledge. If the results of this research study indicated there was not a 
significant relationship between personnel in administrative positions responding more 
accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-administrative 
positions, then further research should be conducted to ensure that all personnel are 
responding accurately to potential campus safety incidents.   
In the State of Missouri where this research was conducted, the Higher Education 
Subcommittee of the state‟s Homeland Security Advisory Council is encouraging 
statewide training. If this research study finds that faculty/staff participation in training 
exercises is significantly related to consistency and accuracy of response and knowledge 
of FERPA regulations, then this study supports statewide efforts to promote the 
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importance of training the campus community and will encourage further professional 
development efforts. 
Summary 
 Campus violence is a reality for institutions of higher education. Colleges and 
universities must be proactive in educating and training the campus community for 
potential campus safety incidents. This chapter provided an overview of the growth in 
campus violence and outlines a study that examines the effectiveness of training when 
included in college and university emergency management plans. Six hypotheses were 
presented that suggest that a relationship will exist between the amount of training an 
employee receives and the consistency and accuracy with which each person will respond 
to a crisis situation, as called for in the institution‟s emergency management plan. The 
scope of the study, limitations, definition of terms, and significance of the study were 
reviewed.  
The following chapters provide additional foundation for this research study. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature that is pertinent to campus violence and 
emergency preparedness but indicates deficiencies in the existing body of knowledge 
concerning the effects of planning on employee response. It demonstrates that although 
campus preparedness has become an issue of great concern, too little has been done to 
evaluate familiarity with the institution‟s emergency management plan and individual 
responsiveness. Chapter 3 provides details on the methodology that was used for this 
research study, and Chapter 4 provides a review of the findings. The final chapter, 
Chapter 5, analyzes these findings, makes recommendations for better and more effective 
institutional planning and response to campus crises, and suggests other areas of research 
that will address additional gaps in the body of literature.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITEATURE 
Introduction 
“Educational institutions are no longer viewed as safe havens for students, 
faculty, or staff. Violence is a community and societal problem that has found its way 
into institutions of higher education” (Schuh, 1998, p. 347). This quote from Violence on 
Campus: Defining the Problems, Strategies for Action demonstrates the critical need for 
additional research about both campus crime and the plans and activities being developed 
by postsecondary institutions to prevent and minimize it. As a prelude to describing such 
a study, this chapter provides a brief summary of the literature related to campus violence 
at institutions of higher education, the four phases of emergency management, the 
creation of threat assessment teams, the importance of an all-hazards emergency 
management plan, the significance of training exercises, the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Clery Act. 
Campus Violence at Institutions of Higher Education 
Over the past 50 years, college and university campuses have become the sites of 
a series of fatal shootings that have changed forever our understanding of campus 
security. The University of Texas shooting by former student Charles Whitman was 
considered the nation‟s worst mass shooting when it occurred in August of 1966. Mr. 
Whitman, an abused child and former Marine, killed 16 people and wounded another 31, 
when he fired a rifle from the University of Texas-Austin clock tower for 96 minutes. In 
a written note, Mr. Whitman blamed his father for his actions (Macleod, 2009; Roberts, 
2007). Twenty-five years later, in November of 1991, Gang Lu, a student who had 
recently completed his doctoral degree, went on a shooting rampage at the University of 
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Iowa. Mr. Lu was upset that he had not received an award for his dissertation and fatally 
shot three professors who served on his dissertation committee as well as a vice president 
and her receptionist before killing himself (Marriott, 1991).  
The next major incident occurred during a student‟s thesis defense in August of 
1996. Frederick Martin Davidson, a former soldier, was a graduate student in engineering 
at San Diego State University. Mr. Davidson deeply resented three of his engineering 
professors and fatally shot these professors during his defense (Nash, 2004). In August of 
2000, James Easton Kelly, a graduate student at the University of Arkansas, was 
dismissed from the Comparative Literature program. Mr. Kelly went to campus and 
killed his advisor, who was also the chair of the committee that denied his reinstatement 
to the graduate program, and then killed himself (CBS News, 2000). Two years later, 
Peter Odighizuwa, a student who flunked out of Appalachian School of Law, went on a 
January shooting spree, killing the Dean of the law school, one professor, and one student 
and injured three other students before he was restrained by students (CNN, 2002). A few 
months later in October of 2002, Robert Flores, a nursing student at the University of 
Arizona, killed three of his professors and then committed suicide. Mr. Flores, an Army 
veteran who had many personal problems, was taking revenge on his professors for 
failing him (Smallwood, 2002). On a campus visit to Shepherd University in September 
of 2006, Douglas Pennington, a man who was being treated for mental illness, killed his 
two sons and then committed suicide (Marcum, 2010).   
Forty-one years after the University of Texas mass shooting, the Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) tragedy became the nation‟s 
worst mass shooting in April of 2007. Seung Hui Cho, an undergraduate student majoring 
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in English who had a history of mental health concerns and disturbing behaviors, killed 
32 students and faculty, wounded 17 additional people, and then killed himself (Virginia 
Tech Review Panel, 2007). Less than a year later, two shootings occurred in February of 
2008. On February 8, Latina Williams, a nursing student, killed two students and then 
herself at Louisiana Technical College. No connections were found between Ms. 
Williams and her two victims (Fox News, 2008; Hoover, 2008). On February 14, Stephen 
Kazmierczak, a former Northern Illinois University student who was currently enrolled in 
graduate studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, walked into an 
introductory geology class, killed five students, and injured 16 others at Northern Illinois 
University before committing suicide. Mr. Kazmierczak was discharged from the Army 
for psychological issues, had spent time in a psychiatric facility, and had quit taking his 
medicine (Friedman, 2008; Heinzmann, et al., 2008). In December of 2009, James 
Hamilton, a student at Northern Virginia Community College with a history of mental 
health problems, attempted to shoot his math teacher because he was failing her class. 
After firing two shots and attempting a third, Mr. Hamilton left the classroom, sat on a 
chair in the hallway, and calmly waited for the police to arrive (Barakat, 2011; Urbina, 
2009). 
In 2010, campus violence assumed a different face at our colleges and universities 
as college employees became the perpetrators of crime. In March of 2010, a custodian at 
Ohio State University by the name of Nathaniel Brown was distraught over the 
impending loss of his job and his home. Mr. Brown killed one of his supervisors and 
injured another employee (10TV, 2010). A few months later in August, a biology faculty 
member at the University of Alabama-Huntsville opened fire during a biology faculty 
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meeting. Amy Bishop had been denied tenure and fatally shot three biology professors 
and injured two other professors and an assistant (Wheaton and Dewan, 2010).  
The University of Texas-Austin was again the victim of campus violence in 
September of 2010. Colton Tooley, a math major who was dressed in a business suit and 
a ski mask, fired several rounds into the air while running through campus before 
committing suicide (Goldman, 2010). Teachers, family members, and friends were 
shocked at Mr. Tooley‟s behavior. There was little explanation for his actions. He was 
known as kind, quiet, and intelligent, not someone who would commit such a violent act 
(Gay, 2010). One month later, Christopher Amyx, a student at Mid-Atlantic Christian 
University who was a part-time police officer, shot another student during an argument in 
the dormitories. Mr. Amyx claimed he had been receiving threats and fired his weapon in 
self defense (CBN News, 2010; “Part-Time Cop Charged,” 2010). These incidents 
demonstrate our long and continuing history of campus violence and emphasize the need 
for institutions of higher education to be prepared to respond to potential campus safety 
incidents.  
Phases of Emergency Management 
Partially in response to the high profile incidents mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, emergency management has become a familiar term to all institutions of 
higher education. The days of feeling completely safe and secure on the college campus 
no longer exist. To assist institutions in preparing for campus emergencies, the U.S. 
Department of Education and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued 
in 2009 an action guide which outlines four phases of emergency management 
preparation and response. These phases include prevention-mitigation, preparedness, 
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response, and recovery. All of the phases are related to one another and build on the 
previous phase (FEMA, 1996). A brief overview of each phase of emergency 
management follows.  
Prevention-Mitigation 
 Prevention-Mitigation is the first phase in emergency management. According to 
the U.S. Department of Education (2009), “Prevention is the action colleges and 
universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis will occur” (p. 7). 
“Mitigation is the action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of 
life and property damage related to an event or crisis, particularly those that cannot be 
prevented” (p. 7). Mitigation also includes educating individuals to reduce the possibility 
of incidents occurring. Mitigation is designed to make campuses safer; however, it does 
not remove all threats from a campus (FEMA, 1996). The components of prevention-
mitigation include analyzing data on the campus community, such as campus crime data 
and campus vulnerability data; examining the facilities and grounds of each campus to 
identify vulnerabilities; and evaluating the culture and climate of the campus community 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
Preparedness 
Preparedness is the second phase in emergency management. “The Preparedness 
phase designs strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for 
potential emergencies” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 9). The components of 
preparedness include developing a command center to activate if an emergency occurs, 
creating policies and procedures in collaboration with community partners, and 
partnering with the community to create formal agreements. Another important 
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component is developing contracts to provide the campus community with necessary 
resources, such as food and transportation, in the event of an emergency. Identifying the 
chain of command in an emergency situation and developing detailed plans to ensure that 
the campus will continue to function in the event of an emergency are essential in the 
preparedness phase. There must also be a plan to unite faculty, staff, and students with 
their family members and an emergency communication plan must be developed for 
keeping the campus community and media informed. Additionally, it is important to 
organize emergency management plans with state and local agencies and develop plans to 
train faculty, staff, and students on emergency preparedness. Collaboration with mental 
health professionals to develop a procedure for identifying and evaluating at-risk 
individuals is important in the preparedness phase. Finally, institutions must ensure 
compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
Response 
Response is the third phase in emergency management. According to the U.S. 
Department of Education (2009), “Response is taking action to effectively contain and 
resolve an emergency” (p. 12). The more comprehensive the prevention-mitigation and 
preparedness phases, the more effective the response will be. The components of 
response include activating the emergency management plan; communicating with 
community partners and the campus community, including the media; and identifying the 
plan for response (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
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Recovery 
Recovery is the fourth phase in emergency management. “The Recovery phase 
establishes procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members‟ 
return to functioning after an emergency” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 14). 
Recovery time will vary depending on the emergency situation and is considered an 
ongoing process. Institutions start planning for the recovery phase during the 
preparedness phase, and it is essential for the leadership team to be involved. The 
components of recovery include recovery of the physical and structural components, 
recovery of the business operations, re-establishment of the academic environment, and 
assistance with individual psychological/emotional needs (U.S. Department of Education, 
2009). Since institutions will be learning during this phase, recovery should also include 
mitigation as part of its process (FEMA, 1996).   
The focus of this research study is on the preparedness phase of emergency 
management. Two of the most important components of preparedness include developing 
and regularly reviewing an all-hazards emergency management plan and engaging faculty 
and staff in training exercises based on the emergency management plan.  
After the tragedy at Virginia Tech, many states conducted a comprehensive 
review of their emergency management procedures. The findings were consistent across 
most of these reports. Institutions need to: (a) create and maintain up-to-date and 
comprehensive emergency management plans, (b) conduct training on emergency 
management plans with the campus community on a regular basis, (c) provide guidance 
and clarification on FERPA, (d) implement notification systems for campus emergencies, 
(e) create threat assessment teams, and (f) increase access to mental health services 
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(Florida Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety, 2007; Illinois Campus 
Security Task Force, 2008; Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007; National 
Association of Attorneys General Task Force on School and Campus Safety, 2007; New 
Mexico Governor‟s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007; North Carolina Campus Safety 
Task Force, 2008; Oklahoma‟s Campus Life and Safety and Security Task Force, 2008; 
O‟Neill, Fox, Depue, & Englander, Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008; Pennsylvania 
State Police Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Team, 2007; State of Wisconsin 
Governor‟s Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007; Task Force on Ohio College Campus 
Safety and Security, 2007). While all of the findings are important for institutions of 
higher education, the focus of this study was on emergency management planning, 
training, and FERPA regulations. However, it is important to understand how colleges 
and universities have increased their efforts to prevent campus violence as a result of the 
Virginia Tech tragedy.  
Threat Assessment Teams 
As noted above, many states have recommended that their institutions create 
threat assessment teams. These teams are designed as a prevention tool to identify 
troubled and potentially dangerous students and/or employees (Cornell, 2010). Teams are 
referred to by various names, including Threat Assessment Team (TAT); Behavioral 
Intervention Team (BIT); Behavioral Assessment Team (BAT); Students of Concern 
(SOC); Campus Assessment, Response, Evaluation (CARE); College Concerns Team 
(CCT); Threat Assessment and Behavioral Intervention (TABI); and Campus Assessment 
Team (CAT) (Sokolow and Lewis, n.d.). For the purposes of this research, the teams will 
be referred to as threat assessment teams.  
21 
 
The team should consist of representatives from the following areas: 
administrators, law enforcement/campus safety, mental health/counseling, faculty, 
student services, legal counsel, housing, and human resources. The team should have 
power to investigate disruptive or threatening behaviors and act accordingly. 
Additionally, team members must have a good working relationship and establish trust 
among one another (Cornell, 2010; Florida Gubernatorial Task Force for University 
Campus Safety, 2007; Fox and Savage, 2009; Illinois Campus Security Task Force, 2008; 
Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007; O‟Neill, Fox, Depue, & Englander, 
Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008). 
As a result of the Cho shootings, the state legislature in Virginia mandated all 
public higher education institutions implement a threat assessment team. Cornell (2010) 
indicated “The history of many school shootings reveals that the attack was preceded by 
threatening statements and behavior that aroused the concern of others weeks or months 
in advance” (p. 10). Threat assessment specifically focuses on individuals who have 
exhibited behavior of concern or expressed threatening remarks. The goal of the threat 
assessment team is to determine if the threat is serious and the individual poses a risk to 
the campus community (Cornell, 2010). There are four steps in threat assessment used by 
the higher education institutions in Virginia as Figure 1 illustrates.  
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Figure 1. Virginia Threat Assessment Decision-Tree. 
From “Threat Assessment in College Settings,” by D. Cornell, 2010, Change 42(1), p. 12. Reprinted with permission of 
the author. 
First, the teams need to identify a threat. This step involves educating the campus 
community to communicate any behavioral concerns or threatening remarks that are 
known to the threat assessment team. This was identified as one of the main weaknesses 
at Virginia Tech. Many individuals across campus had concerns about Seung Hui Cho; 
however, the concerns were not shared with one central team that could have identified 
the risk that Mr. Cho posed (Cornell, 2010). Campus Violence Prevention and Response: 
Best Practices for Massachusetts Higher Education (2008) identified the necessity of 
faculty members to report any students who exhibit disturbing or concerning behaviors 
through their writings and drawings. The Campus Safety Task Force in Wisconsin (2007) 
stressed the importance of reporting repeated classroom incidents of disruptive behavior, 
threats, stalking, and harassment to the threat assessment team. Additionally, the Florida 
Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety (2007) stated the importance of 
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educating faculty, staff, and students on identifying the various warning signs and 
submitting referrals to the threat assessment team.  
The second step involves research and focuses on evaluating how serious the 
threat is. The threat assessment team may use the continuum in Figure 2 to identify the 
level of threat that an individual poses. At one end of the spectrum, an individual may 
have made a statement in jest that was never intended to hurt anyone. On the other hand, 
someone could have communicated their desire to seriously harm individuals. If no 
concerns are found in this step, the issue may be resolved (Cornell, 2010).  
 
Figure 2. Continuum of Threats. 
From “Threat Assessment in College Settings,” by D. Cornell, 2010, Change 42(1), p. 13. Reprinted with permission of 
the author. 
The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) stated “It is essential that this [Threat 
Assessment] Team be charged with building a complete fact-based picture of any 
individual who is considered a risk to him or herself or to the campus community”  
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(p. 15). Discussion must occur with various individuals who know the person of concern. 
The State of Wisconsin Governor‟s Task Force on Campus Safety (2007) recommended 
speaking with individuals who are close to the person of concern, such as faculty, 
roommates, or housing employees, to evaluate the threat. Individuals may shed light on 
the student‟s behavior or other concerns. Teams must be careful to review the context in 
which the threats or disturbing behavior occurred. It is important to consider all details 
before determining the seriousness of the threat. While behavior may be disturbing, it 
may prove harmless (Fox and Savage, 2009).  
Once the team has determined the seriousness of the threat, they may intervene to 
reduce the likelihood that violence will occur. This may involve notifying potential 
victims, recommending counseling for the person of concern, or in severe cases, legal 
action may need to be taken against the person of concern, such as a restraining order 
(Cornell, 2010). The Virginia Tech Review Panel expressed the importance of the threat 
assessment team to “recommend significant and timely interventions to ensure the safety 
of the individual and others in the campus community” (2007, pp. 15-16). The State of 
Illinois Campus Security Task Force (2008) identified the importance of the team‟s 
ability to provide or refer the student to the appropriate resources in a timely manner. 
Most individuals are experiencing mental health issues prior to their incidents of campus 
violence, including the potential for suicide (Deisinger, 2009). 
Finally, it is essential that the threat assessment team continually reviews and 
monitors each situation to ensure that all parties are safe. This step may involve keeping a 
record of the case and asking the individuals involved to contact the team if any concerns 
arise. If the situation involved a threat or concern between two or more individuals, the 
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team may want to periodically follow up with all parties involved in the case to ensure 
safety. For the most serious matters, a case should remain open and be continually 
reviewed to identify any concerns. Records should be maintained even after a student 
graduates in the event another incident occurs (Cornell, 2010). For example, Peter 
Odighizuwa was a former student at Appalachian School of Law, and Stephen 
Kazmierczak formerly attended Northern Illinois University prior to their incidents of 
campus violence at these institutions (CNN, 2002; Friedman, 2008). 
The following statements by Peter Lake summarize the importance of 
implementing threat assessment teams at all colleges and universities and educating the 
campus community to report students who exhibit disturbing or threatening behavior. 
Most important, dangerous people rarely show all of their symptoms to just one 
department or group on campus. A professor may see a problem in an essay, the 
campus police may endure belligerent statements, a resident assistant may notice 
the student is a loner, the counseling center may notice that the student fails to 
appear for a follow-up visit. Acting independently, no department is likely to 
solve the problem. In short, colleges must recognize that managing an educational 
environment is a team effort, calling for collaboration and multilateral solutions. 
(2007, p. 5) 
All-Hazards Emergency Management Plan 
While this research study focuses specifically on campus violence, it is important 
for colleges and universities to consider taking an “all-hazards approach” to planning. 
According to the U.S. Department of Education (2009), “All-hazards planning develops 
capacities and capabilities that are critical to prepare for a full spectrum of emergencies 
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or disasters, including natural hazards and severe weather, biological hazards, and 
violence and terrorism” (p. 4). As a result of the variety of tragedies that have occurred at 
colleges and universities across the country, from crimes of the type listed above, to 
hurricane destruction, to tornados and flooding, an all-hazards approach has become 
standard (Illinois Campus Security Task Force, 2008; Missouri Campus Safety Task 
Force, 2007; O‟Neill, et al., Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008; Pennsylvania State 
Police Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Team, 2007). Jack Watring, chief of police at 
the University of Missouri-Columbia, supported the all-hazards approach when he stated, 
“We need to know what to do if there‟s an active shooter, a natural disaster, a fire, an 
evacuation, tornados or floods; we need to know how to handle it” (Kennedy, 2008,  
p. 13).   
Many scholars have emphasized the importance of institutional preparedness 
through development of a comprehensive emergency management plan. Rollo and 
Zdziarski (2007) identified the emergency management plan as “perhaps the single most 
important crisis management tool a campus can have” (p. 74). The plan is the foundation 
that an institution of higher education will use to perform its operations. A written plan 
provides clear and consistent guidelines regarding how an institution will respond to an 
emergency and aids in avoiding confusion during the response (Rollo and Zdziarski, 
2007).  
In a review conducted in Massachusetts to identify best practices across the 
United States for dealing with crisis situations, higher education officials reviewed 20 
reports from task forces and study groups. The number one recommendation resulting 
from this review was to develop an all-hazards emergency management plan (O‟Neill,  
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et al., Massachusetts Higher Education, 2008). An emergency management plan should 
be in place prior to an incident of campus violence. As stated in the U.S. Department of 
Education‟s Practical Information on Crisis Planning (2007), “A crisis is the time to 
follow the crisis plan, not to make a plan from scratch” (p. 4-1). 
While having a comprehensive emergency management plan is important, it is 
even more critical to ensure that the plan meets the needs of the institution and is up-to-
date. Kennedy (2007) noted, “The Virginia Tech massacre demonstrates the difference 
between having a plan and having the right plan” (p. 12). The Virginia Tech Review 
Panel (2007) found that Virginia Tech‟s emergency management plan was lacking in a 
variety of areas. One of the biggest deficiencies was that the plan did not include 
information related to shootings. The plan was also approximately two years old at the 
time of the Seung Hui Cho shootings and had not been updated during that period. 
Another important component of an emergency management plan is to ensure that 
the plan is reviewed on a regular basis. Zdziarski (2006) stated, “Simply having a written 
plan and crisis protocols is not enough; to be well prepared, you should review and 
update them regularly….Best practices suggest an annual review” (p. 20). A review of 
the literature indicates that prior to the Virginia Tech incident, many institutions had not 
reviewed their emergency management plans with this frequency. Zdziarski (2001) found 
in his dissertation study that of the higher education institutions that reported having 
university crisis management plans, 56% indicated that their university plans were 
reviewed on an annual basis, 24% reported reviewing their plans every three years, 4% 
indicated a review of their plans occurred every five years, and 16% responded “other.” 
Campus security incidents following Zdziarski‟s 2001 study appear to have prompted 
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more frequent review. The National Campus Safety and Security Project Survey (2008) 
found that 89% of participants reported that their emergency management plans were 
updated annually or continually revised as necessary, and 7% of participants advised that 
their plans were revised on a two to three year cycle. The Florida Gubernatorial Task 
Force for University Campus Safety (2007) recommended that emergency management 
plans at colleges and universities be reviewed on a quarterly basis accelerating the cycle. 
The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) indicated that most colleges and universities 
have reviewed their emergency management plans since the tragedy at Virginia Tech.  
An all-hazards emergency management plan that is comprehensive, current, and 
relevant is essential for institutions of higher education. Regular review of the emergency 
management plan is also necessary to ensure accurate information but must be 
accompanied by good training. 
Training 
 
 The literature published by agencies responsible for promoting and encouraging 
campus safety stresses the importance of training exercises if a campus is to be 
appropriately prepared (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement 
Administrators, 2008; National Association of Attorneys General Task Force on School 
and Campus Safety, 2007; U.S. Department of Education, 2009; Virginia Tech Review 
Panel, 2007). The U.S. Department of Education (2007) indicated that training is 
essential in order to successfully implement an emergency management plan. Faculty and 
staff need to understand their responsibilities and expectations during a campus 
emergency if they are to respond appropriately (Zdziarski, 2006). Training also provides 
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the opportunity to identify concerns with the emergency management plan. According to 
the U.S. Department of Education (2009): 
The more the plan is practiced and people are trained on the plan, the better the 
campus responds to emergencies in a comprehensive and effective 
manner….Exercises are an effective way to identify gaps and weaknesses in the 
plan and to train students, staff, faculty, and campus administrators in the 
emergency management procedures. (p. 51) 
In addition, it is important to engage participants in training exercises so that each 
respondent has actively practiced the actions to be taken. Wilson (2007) stated that 
“Training is best when it is active and engaging, not lecture-based. Participants should be 
extensively involved – thinking, talking, practicing, revising, and evaluating” (p. 189). 
There are a variety of exercises that institutions of higher education may conduct, 
including orientation meetings, tabletop exercises, drills, functional exercises, and full-
scale exercises. Practicing and training with community partners is highly recommended 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
 Orientation meetings provide the opportunity to discuss the emergency 
management plan with the campus community. Tabletop exercises allow individuals to 
discuss a scenario and how the institution would prepare for the emergency, respond to 
the emergency, and recover from the emergency (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
These exercises are inexpensive and provide the opportunity for hypothetical emergency 
situations in a less stressful environment (Wilson, 2007). The scenarios presented to 
participants in this research study are similar to what might be used in a tabletop exercise. 
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Drills include a limited number of campus staff and community partners working 
together to respond to a scenario. Functional exercises are comparable to drills but 
involve numerous campus staff and community partners. Individuals respond to a 
simulated event using the emergency management plan and procedures. Full-scale 
exercises are very time-consuming and involve multiple agencies and jurisdictions. These 
exercises use all available resources and examine the collaboration among all individuals 
and systems (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). Full-scale exercises may also be 
referred to as simulation exercises. These exercises require much coordination and 
planning between agencies but provide the opportunity for a realistic version of what may 
occur during an emergency and allow an institution to see if its emergency management 
plan works effectively (Zdziarski, 2006). 
 The need to perform training exercises and educate the campus community has 
grown in importance as a result of the tragedies that have occurred. In a follow up 
research study to Zdziarski‟s 2001 dissertation, Catullo (2008) found a significant change 
in training exercises performed. While 16.4% of institutions reported the use of tabletop 
exercises in 2001, 59.2% of institutions reported their use in 2007. In addition, while 26% 
of institutions reported the use of crisis simulations or drills in 2001, 50.7% reported their 
use in 2007.   
As with updating of the emergency management plan, training must occur on a 
regular basis. The Virginia Tech tragedy has impacted the frequency with which training 
exercises are performed. More tabletop exercises, using the Virginia Tech scenario, are 
now being performed (Kennedy, 2008). The New Mexico Governor‟s Task Force on 
Campus Safety (2007) recommended that exercises occur at least on an annual basis, with 
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full-scale exercises occurring at least every three years. The Virginia Tech Presidential 
Internal Review (2007) advised that much time and attention had been devoted to training 
the campus community regarding campus violence at Virginia Tech but may not have 
been recent enough to seem relevant. “Because individuals tend to process information 
that they judge to be relevant to them, they may ignore policy and procedures related to 
campus violence until they need them, which is often too late” (p. 19). 
 A common concern with emergency preparedness is employee turnover. 
Ensuring that all faculty and staff are trained can be difficult since new faculty and staff 
are employed each year (Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007; Virginia Tech 
Presidential Internal Review, 2007). Oklahoma‟s Campus Life and Safety and Security 
Task Force (2008) suggested that training be required for all new faculty and staff, and 
that training should be provided on a regular basis as a refresher for all employees. 
Institutions need to determine which type(s) of training exercises will be most 
effective for their employees. The U.S. Department of Education (2009) indicated the 
following in relation to training exercises: 
Before making a decision about which type of exercise to facilitate, a higher 
education institution should consider varying factors, including the amount of 
time and resources and collaborative support required to execute the activity 
balanced against the outcome of the experience. For example, while a tabletop 
exercise may be cheaper and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise 
provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency 
situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to implement into plans. 
(p. 52)  
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Due to the importance of being prepared for campus violence, some states feel 
that emergency preparedness should be tied to accreditation and state funding. The 
Florida Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety (2007) recommended 
that campus safety be tied to the accreditation process. The National Association of 
Attorneys General Task Force on School and Campus Safety (2007) recommended that 
states should think about mandating that all colleges and universities participate in 
training exercises at least annually as a requirement to receive state funding. 
Northern Illinois University‟s (NIU) response to its campus shooting in 2008 
demonstrated that well prepared campuses respond better to campus emergencies. In 
many ways, NIU was much better prepared to respond to the campus shooting incident 
than Virginia Tech. For example, NIU had an up-to-date and comprehensive emergency 
management plan in place, along with regular training. NIU did not wait until the 
Virginia Tech tragedy to create its emergency management plan; NIU began preparing its 
campus in 2001. A report on the NIU shooting indicated, “These efforts proved critical 
and life saving in the effective response and follow-up surrounding the February 14 
shooting” (Northern Illinois University, 2008, p. xvi). On the other hand, Virginia Tech 
had an emergency management plan that was about two years old and did not include 
response to a campus shooting incident. Faculty, staff, and students had not been trained 
on this type of incident and were not familiar with the protocol for responding on April 
16, 2007 (Northern Illinois University, 2008; Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). 
Additionally, NIU had in place a threat assessment team to discuss any potential 
concerns that may arise on campus. However, NIU had no reason to suspect that Stephen 
Kazmierczak had mental health issues. In contrast, Virginia Tech did not have a threat 
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assessment team in place at the time of its tragedy. Virginia Tech had a “Care Team” 
which was not effective in addressing the multiple issues that had occurred with Cho, 
both inside and outside of the classroom. The campus community did not share 
information with one another or Cho‟s parents and expressed concern that they did not 
believe they could share information under FERPA. In the NIU incident, the university 
immediately locked down the campus when it learned of the shooting and provided 
updates to the campus community. However, Virginia Tech did not notify its campus in a 
timely manner that a campus emergency had occurred and did not lock down the campus 
(Northern Illinois University, 2008; Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). 
Under the current state of readiness in the United States, we do not know the level 
of preparedness from one campus to another. Individual states do not know if the higher 
education institutions are ready to respond. The purpose of this study was to determine 
how well prepared employees are to respond to campus safety incidents, based on 
evidence that there is still little indication that employees understand emergency 
management plans and can respond appropriately to campus violence. 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 
 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) deals specifically with 
the privacy of education records at secondary and post-secondary institutions that receive 
U.S. Department of Education funds and has important implications for crisis 
management. Student education records are records that are “directly related to a student” 
and maintained by an institution (Hicks, Baker, Hawkey, Myers, & Weese, 2006, p. viii). 
FERPA grants four specific rights to students regarding their education records: the right 
to inspect their records, the right to request amendment to their records, the right to 
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consent to disclosure of their records, and the right to make a complaint with the U.S. 
Department of Education if they suspect these other provisions are violated (Hicks, et al., 
2006).  
FERPA became a significant issue in the Virginia Tech tragedy because a variety 
of incidents occurred that could have been reported regarding Seung Hui Cho‟s behavior 
prior to the fatal shootings. For example, a number of Cho‟s professors and staff from 
Residence Life observed questionable conduct by Cho. Under FERPA, professors and 
staff had the authority to contact Cho‟s parents, but they were not clear about this right. 
When behavior of this type is observed, college employees are often hesitant to make 
these contacts, however, since they understand FERPA to prohibit discussion with 
parents about student activity. The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) indicated the 
following: 
Nothing in FERPA prohibits a school official from sharing with parents 
information that is based on that official‟s personal knowledge or observation and 
that is not based on information contained in an education record. Therefore, 
FERPA would not prohibit a teacher or other school official from letting a parent 
know of their concern about their son or daughter that is based on their personal 
knowledge or observation. (p. H-7)  
It was also the case that when the police department at Virginia Tech received complaints 
regarding Cho‟s behavior, FERPA did not prohibit them from releasing this information 
to Cho‟s parents (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Records that are made and 
maintained for law enforcement purposes only are not subject to FERPA (Hicks, et al., 
2006). 
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The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) stated “Information privacy laws are 
intended to strike a balance between protecting privacy and allowing information sharing 
that is necessary or desirable. Because of this difficult balance, the laws are often 
complex and hard to understand” (p. 63). The Review Panel expressed concern about the 
lack of understanding of FERPA and the inconsistent practice when applying privacy 
laws. The Review Panel proposed that amendments be made to FERPA, specifically 
related to the emergency exception, and recommended that the Department of Education 
provide additional flexibility in the emergency exception of FERPA. 
 Effective January 8, 2009, the Department of Education implemented updated 
FERPA regulations. One of the updates included the emergency exception to FERPA, 
which states:  
An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable 
information from an education record to appropriate parties, including parents of 
an eligible student, in connection with an emergency if knowledge of the 
information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other 
individuals….An educational agency or institution may take into account the 
totality of the circumstances pertaining to a threat to the health or safety of a 
student or other individuals. If the educational agency or institution determines 
that there is an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of a student 
or other individuals, it may disclose information from education records to any 
person whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or 
safety of the student or other individuals. If, based on the information available at 
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the time of the determination, there is a rational basis for the determination, the 
Department will not substitute its judgment for that of the educational agency or  
institution in evaluating the circumstances and making its determination. 
(FERPA, 2008, p. 74854) 
FERPA, as a subject, can be very disconcerting to faculty and staff at institutions 
of higher education. While there is more definitive language as to when an institution 
may release confidential student information, the views are still subjective. However, in 
the wake of Virginia Tech and other campus tragedies, employees must use their 
discretion to protect the campus community. One of the purposes of this study was to 
determine how well informed college employees are of their rights under FERPA and of 
the flexibility the law provides in situations that may lead to a campus emergency.  
Clery Act 
The Clery Act is a federal law that mandates colleges and universities to provide 
information on campus crimes and security policies annually. Formerly known as the 
Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, this law was established in memory 
of Jeanne Ann Clery who was raped and murdered in her college dormitory in 1986. All 
higher education institutions who receive federal financial aid must comply with this law. 
The Clery Act requires colleges and universities to perform the following: (a) annually 
disclose a report that includes the past three years of campus crime statistics and policies 
on campus security; (b) publish institutional crime statistics for seven categories of crime, 
including homicide, sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, vehicle theft, and 
arson; (c) issue “timely warnings” when a serious threat is posed to students and 
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employees; and (d) produce a crime log available for public review (Security on Campus, 
Inc., 2008). 
After the nation‟s worst mass shootings in April of 2007, there was much debate 
about Virginia Tech‟s failure to notify the campus community in a timely manner that a 
gunman was on campus. A warning was issued two hours after the first shootings 
occurred at Virginia Tech. Administrators claimed that they believed a domestic incident 
had occurred and that the campus community was not at risk (Potter, 2010). However, the 
U.S. Department of Education stated, “Virginia Tech‟s failure to issue timely warnings 
about the serious and ongoing threat deprived its students and employees of vital, time-
sensitive information and denied them the opportunity to take adequate steps to provide 
for their own safety” (Potter, 2010, p. 1). Virginia Tech was fined the maximum penalty 
of $55,000 for its negligence, including $27,500 for failure to notify the campus in a 
timely manner and $27,500 for not following the policy on timely warnings (Anderson 
and Shapira, 2011).      
As a result of the Virginia Tech tragedy, the Higher Education Opportunity Act 
amended the Clery Act in 2008 by adding a statement on emergency procedures. When 
publicly disclosing security policies, an institution will “immediately notify the campus 
community upon the confirmation of a significant emergency or dangerous situation 
involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of students or staff” (Security on 
Campus, Inc., 2008, p. 1).  
The Clery Act has been in existence for over 20 years. Higher education 
institutions are increasingly being held accountable for their response to campus safety 
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incidents and have been publicly scrutinized for failure to maintain compliance with the 
provisions of the Clery Act. 
Summary 
  The literature reports the growing number of campus violence incidents that have 
occurred at colleges and universities across the United States over the past 50 years. It 
stresses how unprepared Virginia Tech was to respond to the nation‟s worst mass 
shootings in 2007. The literature also illustrates that though much has been written about 
emergency management plans and how often they are reviewed, we know little about 
how well they are understood or could be followed at colleges and universities.  
Additionally, the literature stresses the importance of understanding FERPA but does 
little to indicate how well employees are educated in its nuances.  
This chapter provided an overview of the literature that is pertinent to campus 
violence, emergency preparedness, and this research study. The relevant topics included a 
brief history of campus violence incidents in the United States, four phases of emergency 
management, threat assessment teams, all-hazards emergency management planning, 
training, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and the Clery Act. The 
following chapter provides details on the methodology that was used for this research 
study. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research study was to determine the relationship between 
active faculty/staff participation in training exercises as part of implementation of an all-
hazards emergency management plan and the consistency and accuracy of response to 
potential campus safety incidents in higher education. This study also examined the 
relationship between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan and 
knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents.  
Participants 
The participants in this research were selected from public two-year and four-year 
colleges and universities in Missouri, which includes 21 public two-year institutions and 
13 public four-year institutions. Of the 21 public two-year institutions located in the state, 
17 institutions participated. One community college was used for the pilot study, and 
three two-year institutions declined to participate. Of the 13 public four-year colleges and 
universities located in Missouri, 12 institutions participated, and one four-year institution 
declined to participate in the study.  
Participants within the institutions were selected using purposive sampling and 
stratified random sampling. According to Berg (2007), “When developing a purposive 
sample, researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about some group to select 
subjects who represent this population” (p. 44). The researcher selected participants who 
should be directly involved and have knowledge of their institution‟s all-hazards 
emergency management plan. Participants included the following from each college or 
university, assuming the institution has the position: president, chief academic officer, 
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dean of student services/student affairs, registrar, faculty members, public safety 
director/chief of police, public safety officer, health/mental health professional, human 
resource director, housing director, and emergency preparedness contact person. The 
researcher reviewed each institution‟s web site to identify the names and e-mail addresses 
of the selected positions. If the contact for the position could not be obtained from the 
college‟s web site, the researcher communicated with the institution to determine the 
appropriate contact person for the position. 
Since faculty members represent the largest number of personnel employed at a 
college or university, the researcher used stratified random sampling to select 20 full-time 
faculty members to complete the survey at each college. Hinkle, et al. (2003) noted that 
“When stratified random sampling is used, the researcher not only defines the strata but 
also determines how many members of each stratum to include in the sample” (p. 145). 
For this study, the researcher reviewed the various departments on each institution‟s web 
site to ensure that representation from each was included. The number of full-time faculty 
at two colleges was less than 20, and all of these individuals were invited to participate. 
 The goal of this research study was to obtain at least a 30% response rate from the 
public two-year and four-year institutions. This goal was met with 29 institutions 
participating, including 17 two-year and 12 four-year institutions, for an 85% 
participation rate by institutions. A secondary goal was to obtain responses from at least 
30% of each type of classification. Overall, 75% of the administrators, 27% of the 
faculty, and 16% of the staff members who were invited to participate completed the 
survey.  
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This study was endorsed by the Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council in Missouri and a request from the Commissioner of Higher 
Education was included with the distribution of the survey and undoubtedly assisted with 
response rates, particularly by administrators. The goal was to encourage a higher 
response rate than might be expected without this endorsement and request. 
Instrument 
 A web-based survey designed by the researcher was used in this study (see 
Appendix A) and was administered using Flashlight, an online surveying tool. The survey 
included two campus emergency scenarios, each followed by a series of statements 
related to personal and institutional responsibility as they related to the crisis. After the 
second scenario was presented, the survey included statements regarding federal 
regulations, specifically related to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA). Participants were also asked to respond to general statements regarding 
personal and institutional practices related to all-hazards emergency management 
planning and training but were asked to respond to the survey without referencing their 
institution‟s emergency management plan. The study utilized a five-point Likert scale, 
with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Demographic 
information related to each participant was also collected. The survey took approximately 
10 minutes for participants to complete.  
The first scenario that was presented to participants involved a college student 
who brought a weapon to campus. Participants were presented with the following 
information: “Dave, a student, brings a gun to school and is seen with the weapon on 
campus. As Brian, another student, is telling you that Dave has a gun, you hear what 
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sounds like shots fired in an adjoining hallway in your building.” A set of statements 
concerning each participant‟s personal role/responsibility was presented. For example, 
participants responded to each response listed in Table 1 using the five-point Likert scale 
with Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree 
(SD): “As soon as I hear shots fired, I would:” 
Table 1 
Personal Responsibility Statements to Which Participants Were Asked to Respond 
                                     Statement          Response 
 
Leave my office/classroom to see what was happening      
 
SA A N D SD 
Lock my office/classroom door SA A N D SD 
Call the Director of Public Safety/Chief of Police SA A N D SD 
Call 911 SA A N D SD 
Alert the campus community that there is an 
   armed person on campus 
 
SA A N D SD 
Do nothing SA A N D SD 
 
 
Participants were also asked to respond to statements concerning institutional 
responsibility. For example, “When my institution is aware that there is a gunman on 
campus, my institution is responsible for:”  
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 2 
Institutional Responsibility Statements to Which Participants Were Asked to Respond 
                                     Statement          Response 
 
Notifying the campus community    
 
SA A N D SD 
Calling 911 SA A N D SD 
Locking down the campus 
 
SA A N D SD 
Maintaining regular communication with the campus     
  community 
 
SA A N D SD 
 
 
After the first set of statements had been answered, participants were presented 
with a second scenario in which the situation had intensified. Participants read the 
following statements: “Situation escalates. Dave takes a classroom of students and their 
instructor hostage.” 
Participants were asked to respond to additional statements concerning personal 
and institutional responsibility and to statements concerning federal regulations using the 
five-point Likert scale. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) was the 
focus of these statements, with a sample including the following: “FERPA allows me to 
release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his parents.” 
Participants were also asked to respond to a series of general statements 
concerning their institution‟s all-hazards emergency management plan and training 
protocol using the five-point Likert scale. An example of these statements included “I 
participate in training and/or drills related to campus violence (e.g., active shooter and/or 
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hostage situation) at least annually as part of my institution‟s emergency management 
plan.” 
The survey also asked participants to respond to various demographic questions, 
such as position, classification of position, status as emergency management coordinator 
at his/her institution, employment at a two-year or four-year institution, name of 
institution, number of years in current position, number of years in profession, highest 
degree earned, gender, and age.  
Reliability 
Reliability is an essential component of any research study. As stated by Groves, 
et al. (2004), “„Reliability‟ is a measure of variability of answers over repeated 
conceptual trials. Reliability addresses the question of whether respondents are consistent 
or stable in their answers” (p. 261). In order to ensure reliability of the survey designed 
by the researcher, a field test was performed with various higher education personnel on 
the researcher‟s campus following receipt of Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval 
from the University of Missouri-St. Louis and from the researcher‟s own campus. Thirty-
one individuals were invited to participate, and 17 responses were received, for a 55% 
response rate. Twelve faculty, four staff, and one administrator participated in the pilot 
study. Feedback was received about the time required to complete the survey. 
Additionally, Cronbach‟s alpha was used to identify the internal consistency of the 
survey instrument. When considering all of the personal responsibility and institutional 
responsibility questions pertaining to both scenarios, Cronbach‟s alpha was .702. The 
removal of two of the personal responsibility questions in the second scenario increased 
the internal reliability of the survey to .765. For the questions related to FERPA, 
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Cronbach‟s alpha was .828; therefore, no changes were made to this portion of the survey 
instrument. 
Validity 
 The validity of the researcher‟s web-based survey was also evaluated. According 
to Groves, et al. (2004), validity is “the extent to which the survey measure accurately 
reflects the intended construct” (p. 254). The researcher presented the survey to members 
of the Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council in 
Missouri to field test the survey for content validity. Members of this subcommittee 
include professionals from higher education, law enforcement, homeland security, fire 
safety, campus public safety, mental health, health and senior services, and law. 
Additionally, students participate in this subcommittee. The individuals serving on this 
subcommittee were well qualified to provide input on the survey questionnaire. The 
researcher made minor adjustments to the survey instrument based on recommendations 
from the Higher Education Subcommittee. 
Review of Emergency Management Plans 
One of the purposes of this research study was to determine the relationship 
between implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes 
faculty/staff participation in training exercises and the accuracy of response to potential 
campus safety incidents in higher education, as called for by the plan. The researcher 
reviewed each institution‟s web site to obtain the emergency management plan. If the 
researcher could not locate an institution‟s plan on their web site, the institution was 
contacted to request a copy of the campus violence section of their emergency 
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management plan. The researcher was able to obtain emergency management plans for 
27 of the 29 participating institutions.  
During the course of this review, it became evident that a variety of emergency 
management guidelines existed for both community colleges and four-year colleges and 
universities, including full-scale plans, brochures, quick reference guides, flip charts, and 
informational web pages. The documents ranged from one page to over 40 pages and 
were referred to by various names, including emergency management plans, emergency 
action plans, emergency operations plans, emergency response plans, emergency 
response guides, campus emergency preparedness guides, emergency procedures, and 
crisis management plans. For the purposes of this study, all documents will be referred to 
as emergency management plans. 
In order to ensure accuracy of response, each institution‟s emergency 
management plan was reviewed to identify where the response to each survey question 
may be found in the plan. The researcher discovered that answers to the personal 
responsibility questions were mostly identified in the emergency management plans, but 
many of the documents did not include information that would tell an employee how to 
respond to the institutional responsibility questions. Therefore, the review focused 
exclusively on accurate responses to 16 of the personal responsibility questions.  
The researcher used a survey template and circled the correct response to each 
personal responsibility question based on each institution‟s emergency management plan. 
If the researcher located the answer to a specific question, the appropriate response of 
strongly agree/agree or strongly disagree/disagree was selected for the question, based on 
the information in the plan. If the researcher could not find the answer to the question in 
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the emergency management plan, neutral was selected. The researcher then used 
intercoder reliability to confirm consistency in coding by asking another employee in 
higher education (a recent Ph.D. graduate) to review 50% of the plans and perform the 
same analysis. Different variations of emergency management documents were reviewed 
by the coder. After the coder reviewed the first two plans, she contacted the researcher to 
obtain clarification. Once the coder had reviewed the plans, they were returned to the 
researcher to compare responses. Then the researcher and the coder met to review any 
inconsistencies. There were only two questions in the active shooter scenario on which 
the researcher and coder had responded differently on some plans. These questions were 
“Call the Director of Public Safety/Chief of Police” and “Assist the injured person.” After 
discussing the reasoning for each of our selections, the researcher and the coder reached 
consensus on the appropriate response to the questions. The researcher also reviewed the 
other plans to ensure accuracy in response for these questions. Once the survey was 
conducted, the researcher compared the responses of each participant for the personal 
responsibility questions against the responses found in his/her institution‟s emergency 
management plan to determine how accurately each participant‟s responses matched the 
institution‟s plan. 
Procedure  
The researcher obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
the University of Missouri-St. Louis (UMSL), then contacted each public higher 
education institution in Missouri to determine how to obtain IRB approval at those 
institutions. Of the 33 public institutions that were targeted for this research study, seven 
required the researcher to go through their campus‟ IRB application process. Seventeen 
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institutions permitted the researcher to provide a copy of UMSL‟s IRB approval as 
satisfying their requirements. One institution requested the IRB application submitted to 
UMSL. Two institutions engaged in dialogue with the researcher about her study but did 
not require any additional documentation. Additionally, six institutions advised that no 
permission was required to administer a survey of this variety on their campus. Seventeen 
institutions requested to see a copy of the researcher‟s survey, 10 institutions requested a 
dissertation abstract, four institutions requested a copy of the e-mail that would be sent to 
individuals asking them to participate in the research study, and two institutions 
requested a copy of the administrators, faculty, and staff at their institutions who would 
be asked to participate in this research study.  
During the process of obtaining permission to conduct research at each institution, 
it was discovered that one institution preferred to initially contact the administrators, 
faculty, and staff prior to the researcher sending the survey, while other institutions 
volunteered to e-mail individuals and encourage participation. The researcher was more 
successful in obtaining responses from the institutions at which administrators, faculty, 
and staff were encouraged to participate.  
A major goal was to ensure that participants understood the importance of this 
research study. The researcher consulted with Missouri‟s Commissioner of Higher 
Education and the Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council on this project, and the Commissioner agreed to write a letter of support for this 
study on behalf of the Higher Education Subcommittee (see Appendix B). This letter was 
provided as a link in the e-mail that was sent to each administrator, faculty, or staff 
member asking for his/her participation in this research study. Additionally, the president 
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of the researcher‟s institution sent an e-mail to his colleagues asking for their institution‟s 
support and participation in this research study.  
 As noted above, each college or university‟s web site was reviewed to identify the 
e-mail address of each individual to be surveyed, with 20 full-time faculty members 
randomly selected by the researcher from each institution‟s web site. For the two 
institutions that employed less than 20 full-time faculty, all full-time faculty employed at 
these two institutions were included. If the researcher was unable to locate the desired 
position on an institution‟s web site or was uncertain as to who served in this capacity, 
the researcher contacted the institution to obtain this information.  
While the researcher knew the identity of each participant, the participants 
remained anonymous throughout the research study. The researcher made contact with 
the participants at each institution through their college e-mail addresses, but e-mail 
addresses were not visible when e-mails were sent to participants to ensure 
confidentiality. E-mails requesting participation were sent to all participants at the same 
institution at the same time. In the initial e-mail contact (see Appendix C), the researcher 
explained the purpose and value of the study, included a link to the letter of support from 
the Commissioner of Higher Education, ensured that confidentiality would be 
maintained, explained the informed consent process, and requested participation. The 
researcher also provided a link to the web-based survey. The first phase of data collection 
yielded 125 responses, or 50%, of the survey responses. 
After a 10-day time period, another e-mail was sent to participants who had not 
yet completed the web-based survey. The subject line indicated “Reminder: Campus 
Safety Survey.” Another link to the web-based survey was included in the e-mail 
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message. The researcher received an additional 97 responses, or 37%, during this time 
period. After another 10-day time period, a final reminder e-mail with the subject line 
“Final Reminder: Campus Safety Survey” went to all participants who had not yet 
completed the web-based survey. This e-mail also included the link to the web-based 
survey. The final reminder resulted in another 29 responses, or 11%, of the total received. 
Design 
A quantitative research design was employed in this research study. The 
dependent variables included the responses to each of the personal responsibility, 
institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions. These responses assisted in identifying 
the consistency of response to potential campus safety incidents, accuracy of response to 
potential campus safety incidents, and knowledge level of FERPA regulations. The 
independent variables included responses to the emergency management planning and 
training questions as well as various demographic factors, including position, 
classification of position, status as emergency management coordinator at his/her 
institution, employment at a two-year or four-year institution, name of institution, number 
of years in current position, number of years in profession, highest degree earned, gender, 
and age.  
 Data collected through the researcher‟s web-based survey were analyzed using the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The General Linear Model (GLM) – 
multivariate analysis with multiple criterion variables was used to analyze data. The 
GLM is “A general statistical model describing the linear relationship between one or 
more dependent variables and one or more independent variables” (Bryman and Cramer, 
2011, p. 354). Multivariate analysis is “The analysis of the relationship(s) between more 
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than two variables” (Bryman and Cramer, 2011, p. 357). Multiple criterion variables in 
this case included the different dependent variables used in this study, including the 
responses to each of the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA 
questions. Multivariate analysis was used to identify what independent variables were 
significant in the presence of all dependent variables. Additionally, this statistical tool 
allowed the researcher to use between-subjects effects to determine if a relationship 
existed between the dependent variables and each of the significant independent 
variables. 
 Data was also analyzed using crosstabulations and case summaries. A 
crosstabulation, also referred to as a contingency table, is “A table comprising rows and 
columns that includes at least two variables and that expresses the association between 
variables. Contingency tables include frequencies, i.e. the number of cases for each 
intersection in the table” (Bryman and Cramer, 2011, p. 351). Crosstabulations were used 
to identify relationships between dependent variables and/or independent variables. For 
example, crosstabulations were used to determine consistency in response for all personal 
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions by institution and by 
classification. Crosstabulations also served to identify how institutions responded to 
various demographic and emergency management independent variables. 
Case summaries, or a report that identifies responses to each dependent variable 
by specific independent variables, were also used to analyze data.  For example, case 
summaries were used to identify the accuracy of response for all personal responsibility 
and FERPA questions by institution and by classification within institution. 
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Limitations 
This study was limited by several factors that are indicative of characteristics of 
both the nature of the study and the institutions involved. There were some institutions, 
such as community colleges, that did not have all participant positions. For example, 12 
of the community colleges did not have housing, four of the community colleges did not 
have health/mental health professionals, and two did not have public safety departments 
on campus. Additionally, two of the two-year institutions are part of community college 
districts and have district coordinators for the Human Resources and Registrar 
departments. Two institutions also did not specifically identify an emergency 
preparedness contact person and utilized a group of individuals to serve in this capacity.  
In these cases, there were not comparable responses from each institution.  
The researcher also received low response rates from one of the employee groups. 
Despite three e-mail requests for participation, only 16% of staff members who received 
the survey chose to participate. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the low response rate 
from staff members limited the ability of the researcher to draw firm conclusions from 
the data, especially related to training. 
The study was further limited by the fact that some institutions did not provide 
emergency management plans, and by the vast differences among plans in terms of 
completeness. This finding is important to the study because in some cases, it did limit 
the ability of the model to compare responses by participants to statements in their 
institutional plans. 
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Summary 
This chapter provided comprehensive information on the methodology that was 
used to collect and analyze data for this research study. A web-based survey designed by 
the researcher was administered using an online survey tool, and the reliability and 
validity of the survey were reviewed. Administrators, faculty, and staff at 29 public 
higher education institutions in Missouri were surveyed to identify their consistency and 
accuracy of response to potential campus safety incidents and their knowledge of FERPA 
regulations when responding to these incidents. Participants also responded to various 
demographic and emergency management planning and training questions to assist with 
identifying their level of emergency preparedness. Emergency management plans were 
also reviewed for 27 institutions to assist in determining accuracy of response to the 
survey questions. Multivariate analysis with multiple criterion variables, crosstabulations, 
and case summaries were used to analyze the data in SPSS. Chapter 4 includes the 
findings from this research. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Introduction 
 Chapter 4 focuses on describing the participants in this research study, reviews 
the survey instrument and the results obtained, and reports how the researcher dealt with 
missing data. The statistical tools that were used to analyze data are presented. The 
chapter also includes a discussion of emergency management planning and training at the 
participating institutions. Each of the six hypotheses is examined with a report on the 
findings of this research. Additionally, comments are shared that the researcher received 
from both participants and non-participants regarding her study. 
Participants 
A total of 802 administrators, faculty, and staff from 29 public higher education 
institutions in Missouri were invited to participate in this research study. A total of 251, 
or 31%, completed the survey. Responses were received from 159 participants at 
community colleges and 92 individuals at four-year colleges and universities. Overall 
response rates from each institution ranged from a minimum of 14% to a maximum of 
75% of those invited to participate. Six participant response sets were eliminated due to 
insufficient data, which was defined as responses missing more than 25% of the 
requested information. Therefore, the survey results are based on responses from 245 
administrators, faculty, and staff.  
Figure 3 identifies the number of administrators, faculty, and staff who 
participated in this research study by type of institution. Overall, 65 administrators, 155 
faculty, and 24 staff responded (one individual did not report his/her classification). Of 
the 65 administrators, 31 represented community colleges and 34 were from four-year 
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colleges and universities. Of the 155 faculty, 104 represented community colleges and 51 
were from four-year colleges and universities. Finally, of the 24 staff members who 
participated, 17 represented community colleges, while seven represented four-year 
colleges and universities.  
 
Figure 3. Number of Participants by Classification and Type of Institution.  
 
One hundred fourteen of the 245 participants were male, while 126 were female. 
Five participants did not identify their gender. The age of participants ranged from 26 to 
77 with a mean age of 50. The number of years in the respondent‟s current position 
ranged from 0 to 52 with a mean of 10 years, while the number of years in the profession 
ranged from 0 to 52 with a mean of 21 years.  
Eighteen respondents reported that they are the emergency management 
coordinators at their institutions, including 10 administrators, one faculty member, and 
seven staff members. Of these 18 emergency management coordinators, four did not 
provide their positions and the remaining 14 identified their positions as follows: Chief of 
Police (3 respondents), Dean of Student Affairs, Director, Director of Facilities, Director 
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of Health and Wellness Services, Director of Institutional Safety, Director of Safety, 
Director of Security, Director of Student Life and Development, Faculty (Environmental 
Health and Safety), Interim Provost, and Risk Manager. Respondents at two institutions 
reported more than one emergency management coordinator. Therefore, there were 14 
cases in which a college or university did not have a response from a person identifying 
him or herself as the emergency management coordinator. 
The response rate to the survey for administrators was better than expected, and 
the rate for faculty approached the desired 30% considered acceptable for statistical 
analysis. The percentage received from staff was disappointing, but with the declining 
response rate with each reminder to potential participants, it was determined that attempts 
to solicit further surveys would be fruitless. This disparity in response rates complicates 
some of the analysis as will be discussed later. A more significant issue, however, is that 
rates for groups varied by institution, making it impossible to determine if training 
occurred evenly among employee groups, and therefore if training percentages 
represented the institution as a whole. For this reason, some of the findings must be 
viewed as inferences that suggest issues demanding further investigation, rather than as 
accurate representations of the institutions as a whole. 
Instrument 
The researcher designed a web-based survey that served as the primary data 
collection instrument for this study. The survey included an active shooter scenario and a 
hostage scenario for which participants were asked to respond to a series of personal 
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions. The survey also 
included questions related to emergency management planning and training at each 
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institution. A five-point Likert scale, with responses ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree, was used for this survey. Additionally, demographic information was 
collected from each participant. 
The researcher used Cronbach‟s alpha to identify the internal consistency of the 
survey instrument. When considering all of the personal responsibility, institutional 
responsibility, and FERPA questions pertaining to both scenarios, Cronbach‟s alpha was 
.765. The researcher also reviewed the internal consistency for the categories of 
dependent variables. For the personal responsibility questions, Cronbach‟s alpha was 
.668; for the institutional responsibility questions, Cronbach‟s alpha was .877; and for the 
FERPA questions, Cronbach‟s alpha was .777. The standard for an acceptable 
Cronbach‟s alpha result is .70 or above (Nunnally, 1978, as cited in Bryman and Cramer, 
2011). Therefore, when considering all variables together, the internal consistency of the 
survey instrument was acceptable. 
Adjusting For Missing Data 
Responses from six participants were not used in data analysis because they were 
missing significant data, which was defined as not responding to 25% or more of the 
survey questions. For the other respondents who did not answer one or more questions in 
the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, or FERPA categories, the 
following procedure was used to complete missing data. The researcher identified what 
she believed to be three of the most important demographic variables in the study, 
including classification (administrator, faculty, or staff), employment at a two-year or 
four-year institution, and gender. The researcher then reviewed the mean response to each 
question using the three demographic variables identified above. Any missing personal 
58 
 
responsibility, institutional responsibility, or FERPA responses were assigned the 
appropriate mean response based on the three demographic variables that matched the 
respondent. This served to keep the answers of these individuals with missing data 
“statistically neutral” for questions where no answer was provided.   
Descriptive Statistics 
The means, standard deviations, and variances for the dependent variables in this 
research study vary considerably. When considering only the personal responsibility 
questions, the mean values ranged from 1.0795 (S1PR7) to 4.7914 (S2PR5), and standard 
deviations were as small as .29682 (S1PR7) to as large as 1.37176 (S1PR12). The 
variances ranged from .088 (S1PR7) to 1.882 (S1PR12). There was much consensus 
about the statement pertaining to the active shooter scenario that indicated “Do nothing” 
(S1PR7). Ninety-three percent of participants responded that they strongly disagreed with 
this statement. There was agreement about “Be observant of my surroundings” (S2PR5) 
for the hostage scenario. Eighty-two percent of respondents indicated that they strongly 
agreed that this was important. However, there was not consensus about whether to 
“Alert the campus community that someone has been injured” (S1PR12). While 58% 
strongly agreed or agreed, 24% of participants strongly disagreed or disagreed, 
accounting for the larger standard deviation and variance in response. 
For the institutional responsibility questions, the mean values ranged from 4.5598 
(S1IR3) to 4.8490 (S2IR2), and standard deviations ranged from .45001 (S2IR2) to 
.80412 (S1IR3). The variances ranged from .203 (S1IR5 and S2IR2) to .647 (S1IR3). 
There was greater agreement on the institutional responsibility questions than the 
personal responsibility questions. For example, 88% of respondents strongly agreed that 
the institution should “Call 911” (S2IR2) when a hostage situation occurs. The standard 
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deviation and variance for this dependent variable were small. While 71% of participants 
strongly agreed that their institution is responsible for “Locking down the campus” 
(SIIR3) during an active shooter situation, the standard deviation and variance were 
somewhat larger as some individuals did not agree with this statement. 
The mean values ranged from 2.2366 (F3) to 3.4653 (F2) when reviewing the 
three questions related to FERPA. The standard deviations were large but very close and 
ranged from 1.40105 (F2) to 1.51861 (F1), while the variances were large and ranged 
from 1.963 (F2) to 2.306 (F1). These results indicate that there was not consensus on the 
correct response to the FERPA questions. Participants responded at both ends of the 
spectrum for these questions. 
General Linear Model – Multivariate Analysis 
 The General Linear Model (GLM) using multivariate analysis with multiple 
criterion variables was one of the statistical tools used to analyze the research data. The 
dependent variables are comprised of the questions from the active shooter and hostage 
scenarios, including the 18 questions concerning personal responsibility, the 12 questions 
regarding institutional responsibility, and the three FERPA questions.  
The independent variables are comprised of various demographic data as well as 
data related to emergency management planning and training at each institution. The 
demographic variables included the following:  
 Position 
 Classification 
 Emergency management coordinator 
 Employment at a two-year or four-year institution 
 Employment at which institution 
 Number of years in current position 
 Number of years in profession 
 Highest degree earned 
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 Gender 
 Age 
 
The emergency management variables included the following: 
 
 Implementation of emergency management plan at the respondent‟s 
institution 
 Reading of institution‟s emergency management plan 
 Plan addresses active shooter situation 
 Plan addresses hostage situation 
 Involvement in the development of the institution‟s emergency 
management plan 
 Participation in training and/or drills related to campus violence at least 
annually 
 Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for administrators 
 Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for full-time faculty 
 Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for part-time faculty 
 Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for full-time staff 
 Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for part-time staff 
 Mandatory participation in training and/or drills for student workers 
 
One of the advantages of using multivariate analysis with multiple criterion 
variables was that the probability of making a Type I error was reduced. Additionally, 
analyzing all of the dependent variables together provided a more “sensitive measure of 
the effects of the independent variables” (Bryman and Cramer, 2011, p. 263).    
 The multivariate analysis performed on the 33 dependent variables together found 
that only three independent variables were significant at the .05 level. These three are 
analyzed in detail in Table 3. Two of these are demographic variables, position as 
emergency management coordinator and number of years in profession. Serving as the 
emergency management coordinator at his/her institution was significant at .008. The 
second demographic variable, number of years in profession, was significant at .002. The 
third significant independent variable is an emergency management variable, 
participation in training and/or drills is mandatory for student workers, and was 
significant at .035. 
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Table 3 
Multivariate Tests 
Effect     Value   F   Hypothesis df     Error df    Sig. 
 
D3 – Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
Pillai's Trace 
 
 
.315 
 
1.843
a
* 
 
33.000 
 
132.000 
 
.008 
Wilks' Lambda 
 
.685 1.843
a
* 33.000 132.000 .008 
Hotelling's Trace 
 
.461 1.843
a
* 33.000 132.000 .008 
Roy's Largest Root 
 
.461 1.843
a
* 33.000 132.000 .008 
 D7 – # of years in   
 profession 
Pillai's Trace 
 
.341 2.072
a
* 33.000 132.000 .002 
Wilks' Lambda 
 
.659 2.072
a
* 33.000 132.000 .002 
Hotelling's Trace 
 
.518 2.072
a
* 33.000 132.000 .002 
Roy's Largest Root 
 
.518 2.072
a
* 33.000 132.000 .002 
 E12 – Participation 
 in training and/or  
 drills is mandatory 
 for student workers       
  Pillai's Trace 
 
.285 1.591
a
* 33.000 132.000 .035 
Wilks' Lambda 
 
.715 1.591
a
* 33.000 132.000 .035 
Hotelling's Trace 
 
.398 1.591
a
* 33.000 132.000 .035 
Roy's Largest Root 
 
.398 1.591
a
* 33.000 132.000 .035 
 Note. a = exact statistic 
 *p < .05 
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When looking at the between-subject effects for the three significant independent 
variables, many relationships were identified. Table 4 identifies the 10 dependent 
variables that were significant with emergency management coordinator, the four  
dependent variables that were significant with the number of years in profession, and the 
five dependent variables that were significant with mandatory participation in training for 
student workers. One of the dependent variables, the FERPA question related to releasing 
information about Dave‟s behavior to students, was significant with all three independent 
variables. The other two FERPA questions about releasing information to Dave‟s parents 
and to colleagues were significant with emergency management coordinator and number 
of years in profession.  
The personal responsibility question for the active shooter scenario, “Leave my 
office/classroom to see what was happening” and the personal responsibility question for 
the hostage scenario, “I feel well prepared” were significant with two of the independent 
variables, emergency management coordinator and mandatory participation in training 
for student workers. The personal responsibility question for the active shooter scenario, 
“Confront the gunman” was also significant with two of the independent variables, 
emergency management coordinator and number of years in profession. 
Table 4 
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Three Independent Variables 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D3 – Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
S1PR2 – Leave my 
office/classroom to see 
what was happening 
 
12.508 
 
1 
 
12.508 
 
9.852* 
 
.002 
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Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D3 – Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
S1PR9 – Confront the 
gunman 
 
 
15.154 
 
1 
 
15.154 
 
23.187* 
 
.000 
  S1IR8 – Maintaining    
 regular communication     
 with the campus  
 community 
 
2.078 1 2.078 4.591* .034 
 S2PR1 – I feel well 
prepared 
 
2.682 1 2.682 3.946* .049 
 S2PR2 – Confront Dave 
physically 
 
16.440 1 16.440 17.701* .000 
 S2PR3 – Confront Dave 
verbally 
 
5.860 1 5.860 5.578* .019 
 S2IR4 – Maintaining 
regular communication 
with the campus 
community 
 
2.052 1 2.052 4.006* .047 
 F1 – Release 
information to Dave’s 
parents 
 
 
 
9.432 1 9.432 4.687* .032 
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Source 
 
Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D3 – Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
F2 – Release 
information to my 
colleagues 
 
 
7.679 
 
1 
 
7.679 
 
4.289* 
 
.040 
 
 
F3 – Release 
information to students 
 
31.912 1 31.912 18.003* .000 
D7 – Number of 
years in profession 
S1PR9 – Confront the 
gunman 
 
3.105 1 3.105 4.751*    .031 
 
 
F1 – Release 
information to Dave’s 
parents 
 
11.152 1 11.152 5.542* .020 
 F2 – Release 
information to my 
colleagues 
 
16.422 1 16.422 9.172* .003 
 F3 – Release 
information to students 
 
17.535 1 17.535 9.893* .002 
 E12 –      
 Participation 
 in training  
 and/or drills is   
 mandatory 
 for student  
 workers    
 S1PR2 – Leave my      
 office/classroom to see     
 what was happening                
 
 
6.719 1 6.719 5.292* .023 
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Source 
 
Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
 E12 –      
 Participation 
 in training  
 and/or drills is   
 mandatory 
 for student  
 workers    
 
S1PR5 – Call 911 
 
2.005 
 
1 
 
2.005 
 
3.910* 
 
.050 
 S1IR3 – Locking down 
the campus 
 
3.169 1 3.169 5.750* .018 
 S2PR1 – I feel well 
prepared  
 
3.924 1 3.924 5.773* .017 
 F3 – Release 
information to students 
 
8.184 1 8.184 4.617* .033 
 
Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional 
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions. 
*p = < .05 
Emergency Management Coordinator 
 When looking more closely at the relationship between the independent variable, 
emergency management coordinator, and all of the dependent variables, the researcher 
discovered that additional dependent variables were significant when multivariate 
analysis was performed using only this independent variable. Some dependent variables 
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were also no longer significant. This occurred because the number of independent 
variables being analyzed decreased to only one as opposed to all independent variables. 
Table 5 presents the dependent variables that were significant in the presence of 
only the emergency management coordinator independent variable. Bold indicates a new 
significant dependent variable, black indicates a dependent variable that was previously 
identified as significant, and italics indicate a dependent variable that was no longer 
significant. All of the new significant variables were personal responsibility questions 
related to the active shooter and hostage scenarios. The variables that were no longer 
significant were institutional responsibility questions related to the active shooter and 
hostage scenarios. 
Table 5 
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Emergency Management Coordinator 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D3 – 
Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
S1PR1 – I feel well prepared 
 
 
19.380 
 
1 
 
19.380 
 
17.101* 
 
.000 
 S1PR2 – Leave my 
office/classroom to see what was 
happening 
 
20.060 1 20.060 15.431* .000 
 S1PR6 – Alert the campus 
community that there is an 
armed person on campus 
 
9.649 1 9.649 6.146* .014 
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Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D3 – 
Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
 S1PR9 – Confront the gunman 
 
 
40.316 
 
1 
 
40.316 
 
49.963* 
 
.000 
  
S1PR12 – Alert the campus 
community that someone has 
been injured 
 
 
10.151 
 
1 
 
10.151 
 
5.455* 
 
.020 
 S2PR1 – I feel well prepared 
 
29.962 1 29.962 22.356* .000 
 S2PR2 – Confront Dave 
physically 
 
48.795 1 48.795 40.899* .000 
 S2PR3 – Confront Dave verbally 
 
5.449 1 5.449 4.669* .032 
 S2PR4 – Try to establish a 
rapport with Dave 
 
4.828 1 4.828 4.183* .042 
 F1 – Release information to 
Dave’s parents 
 
39.797 1 39.797 18.559* .000 
 F2 – Release information to my 
colleagues 
 
21.017 1 21.017 11.092* .001 
  F3 – Release information to   
 students 
47.542 1 47.542 26.325* .000 
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Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D3 – 
Emergency 
management 
coordinator 
 
S1IR8 – Maintain regular 
communication with the campus 
community 
 
 
.067 
 
1 
 
.067 
 
.158 
 
.691 
 S2IR4 – Maintain regular 
communication with the campus 
community 
 
.131 1 .131 .256 .614 
 
 
 
 
Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional 
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions. 
*p = < .05 
This analysis identifies an important relationship between an individual who is the 
emergency management coordinator and the knowledge that he/she possesses when 
personally responding to campus safety incidents, including the active shooter and 
hostage scenarios. As one would hope, emergency management coordinators are well 
informed on how to respond to incidents of campus violence. 
Number of Years in Profession 
 When performing multivariate analysis on the number of years in profession as 
the only independent variable, the four dependent variables that were previously 
significant were no longer significant. However, four additional dependent variables were 
significant as Table 6 demonstrates. Significant variables are identified in bold, while 
italics indicate variables that were no longer significant. The new significant variables 
consist of four personal responsibility questions for both scenarios. The variables that 
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were no longer significant included one personal responsibility question for the active 
shooter scenario and all of the FERPA questions. 
The number of years in the higher education profession was also a good indicator 
of how well prepared an administrator, faculty, or staff member is to respond to campus 
safety incidents. Three of the significant dependent variables related to contacting the 
appropriate authorities when an incident of campus violence occurs. Therefore, an 
employee who has more experience is more likely to be prepared to respond 
appropriately to campus safety incidents. 
Table 6 
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Number of Years in Profession 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D7 – Number 
of years in 
profession 
 
S1PR4 – Call the Director of 
Public Safety/Chief of Police 
 
 
58.919 
 
45 
 
1.309 
 
1.456* 
 
.045 
 S1PR5 – Call 911 
 
33.507 45 .745 1.764* .005 
 S1PR11 – Call 911 
  
29.108 45 .647 1.743* .006 
 S2PR1 – I feel well prepared 
 
92.226 45 2.049 1.519* .029 
 S1PR9 – Confront the gunman 
 
46.540 45 1.034 1.122 .295 
 F1 – Release information to 
Dave’s parents 
 
 
102.883 45 2.286 .965 .541 
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Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
D7 – Number 
of years in 
profession 
 
F2 – Release information to my 
colleagues 
 
 
92.492 
 
45 
 
2.055 
 
1.072 
 
.365 
 F3 – Release information to 
students 
83.072 45 1.846 .873 .698 
 
 
 
Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional 
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions. 
*p = < .05 
Participation in Training and/or Drills is Mandatory for Student Workers 
 The test of between-subjects effects for the independent variable, participation in 
training and/or drills is mandatory for student workers, identified four additional 
dependent variables that were significant. There were three dependent variables that were 
no longer significant as Table 7 shows. Bold indicates new dependent variables that were 
significant, black identifies dependent variables that were previously identified as 
significant, and italics indicate dependent variables that were no longer significant. Three 
of the new significant variables were personal responsibility questions for both scenarios, 
and one variable was an institutional responsibility question for the hostage scenario. The 
variables that were no longer significant were a combination of personal responsibility, 
institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions. 
Although students were not included in this research, it is interesting that student 
worker participation in training was significantly related to some of the dependent 
variables for both the active shooter and hostage scenarios. One might conclude that 
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some of the respondents were involved in training student workers and therefore became 
more knowledgeable about their personal and institutional responsibilities when 
responding to incidents of campus violence. 
Table 7 
Test of Between-Subjects Effects: Participation in Training and/or Drills is Mandatory 
for Student Workers 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
E12 – Participation 
in training and/or 
drills is mandatory 
for student workers 
 
S1PR1 – I feel well prepared 
 
 
16.328 
 
4 
 
4.082 
 
3.491* 
 
.009 
 S1PR2 – Leave my 
office/classroom to see what 
was happening 
 
20.729 4 5.182 4.028* .004 
 S1PR8 – Assist the injured 
person 
 
13.733 4 3.433 4.319* .002 
 S2PR1 – I feel well prepared 
 
21.995 4 5.499 3.956* .004 
 S2PR2 – Confront Dave 
physically 
 
13.238 4 3.310 2.490* .044 
 S2IR4 – Maintain regular 
communication with the 
campus community  
 
6.265 4 1.566 3.077* .017 
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Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
 
E12 – Participation 
in training and/or 
drills is mandatory 
for student workers 
 
S1PR5 – Call 911 
 
 
4.525 
 
4 
 
1.131 
 
2.252 
 
.064 
 S1IR3 – Locking down the 
campus 
 
2.847 4 .712 1.085 .365 
 F3 – Release information to 
students 
 
13.262 4 3.315 1.670 .158 
 
Note. S1 = Scenario 1; S2 = Scenario 2; PR = personal responsibility questions; IR = institutional 
responsibility questions; F = FERPA questions. 
*p = < .05 
Emergency Management Planning and Training 
 The premise of this study was that personnel at institutions that have emergency 
management plans that include training will respond more consistently and accurately to 
potential campus safety incidents as well as have more knowledge of FERPA regulations 
when responding to these incidents. Many questions in this research focused on each 
institution‟s emergency management plan and active participation in training exercises. 
Following are the results that relate to emergency management planning and training. 
Emergency Management Plans 
 Of the 245 participants in this research study, 82% strongly agreed or agreed that 
their institution had implemented an emergency management plan. However, only 62% 
of administrators, faculty, and staff strongly agreed or agreed that they have read their 
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institution‟s emergency management plan. Administrators were most likely to read their 
institution‟s plan (85% strongly agreed or agreed), staff members were second (67% 
strongly agreed or agreed), while faculty were least likely to have read their college‟s 
plan (52% strongly agreed or agreed). Additionally, only 21% of participants strongly 
agreed or agreed that they were involved in the development of their institution‟s 
emergency management plan. Administrators were most likely to be involved in the 
development of their institution‟s plan with 52% indicating that they strongly agreed or 
agreed, followed by staff at 46%, and faculty at 5%.   
In terms of content included in emergency management plans, 65% of participants 
indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed that their institution‟s plan addressed an 
active shooter situation, while only 49% strongly agreed or agreed that their plan 
discussed a hostage situation. Of the 27 emergency management plans reviewed, 24 
(89%) addressed an active shooter situation, while only 15 (56%) included information 
on how to respond to a hostage situation.  
When reviewing accuracy of response for what was included in each institution‟s 
emergency management plan, Figure 4 shows that participants indicated they were not 
very knowledgeable about what is included in their plans. While three institutions 
indicated 100% accuracy regarding whether an active shooter situation was included in 
their institution‟s emergency management plan, two institutions responded with 0% 
accuracy. Overall, 13 institutions (48%) were at least 75% accurate and 19 institutions 
(70%) were at least 50% accurate regarding the inclusion of an active shooter situation in 
their institution‟s emergency management plan. However, at three institutions, 
respondents were extremely unknowledgeable regarding the inclusion of an active 
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shooter scenario in their plans. At these institutions, 64%, 67%, and 80% of respondents, 
respectively, reported that their plan included this scenario when in actuality, it did not.  
Accuracy regarding a hostage situation being included in plans was even lower. 
Only one institution responded with 100% accuracy, while four institutions responded 
with 0% accuracy. Three of the 27 institutions (11%) were at least 75% accurate and 10 
institutions (37%) were at least 50% accurate regarding the inclusion of a hostage 
situation in their institution‟s plan. A more significant number of respondents indicated 
that their plans included a hostage situation when it did not. Respondents from eight 
institutions reported percentages ranging from 43% to 70% of agreement that their plan 
included response to this crisis when it did not. Since 38% of respondents indicated that 
they had not read their institution‟s emergency management plan, it was not surprising 
that awareness of what information is actually included in these plans was relatively low. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage Who Responded Accurately Regarding What is Included in Their 
Institution‟s Emergency Management Plan. 
 
It must be acknowledged at this point that in addition to uneven response rates by 
employee type, response rates also varied by institution. The researcher hoped to receive 
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at least five responses from each college but received four responses from two 
institutions and two responses from two of the 29 colleges. These four colleges were 
among the smallest in the state to participate, but these low rates contributed to the 
challenges of drawing firm conclusions from the data.   
Training 
Only 35% of participants strongly agreed or agreed that they participate at least 
annually in training and/or drills related to campus violence incidents (e.g., active shooter 
and/or hostage situation). Training most frequently occurred with administrators (58% 
strongly agreed or agreed), followed by staff (50% strongly agreed or agreed), and then 
faculty (23% strongly agreed or agreed).  
When asking about mandatory training and/or drills related to campus violence 
for employees, respondents indicated that full-time employees were more likely to 
receive training. Thirty-seven percent responded that they strongly agreed or agreed that 
administrators participate in training, followed by 27% for full-time staff, 26% for full-
time faculty, 17% for part-time staff, 15% for part-time faculty, and 14% for student 
workers. 
The hypotheses in this research study were framed according to institutions that 
have emergency management plans that include training and those that do not include 
training. According to the participants, responses ranged from 0% to 100% by institution 
that they strongly agreed or agreed that they participate in training and/or drills related to 
campus violence at least annually. Figure 5 reports that only respondents from one 
institution all agreed that they participate in training at least annually, while respondents 
from five institutions unanimously agreed that they do not participate in training at least 
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annually. Only eight institutions had consensus from at least 50% of their respondents 
that they participate in training exercises on an annual basis. It must again be noted that 
the number of respondents varied considerably from one institution to another. These 
percentages must be viewed as indications of training activity rather than as statistical 
evidence.  
A limited number of respondents indicated that they participate in training and/or 
drills related to campus violence at least annually. Since the highest percentage of 
respondents was administrators, one might conclude that the training percentage may be 
higher because administrators are most likely to participate in training.  
 
Figure 5. Percentage Who Participate in Training by Institution (includes strongly agree 
and agree responses). 
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Null Hypotheses 
 
 The following null hypotheses were used to guide this research study. Each 
hypothesis is examined in terms of the data collected, and a determination is made to 
reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to 
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions 
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.  
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to 
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions 
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. 
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA 
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel 
at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan 
that does not include training. 
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety 
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions 
when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include 
training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that 
do not include training. 
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Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding 
to potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various 
higher education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency 
management plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards 
emergency management plans that do not include training. 
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not 
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in 
non-administrative positions. 
 When reviewing consistency of response for the personal responsibility, 
institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions for the active shooter and hostage 
scenarios, the researcher looked for the frequency with which respondents answered the 
same within an institution. For accuracy of response, the correct answers to the personal 
responsibility questions for each institution were identified by reviewing each 
institution‟s emergency management plan. Based on this criterion, each individual‟s 
responses were manually compared with the correct response for his/her institution.  
Null Hypothesis #1 
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.  
This hypothesis first is reviewed in terms of consistency of response to the 
personal responsibility questions, and then the institutional responsibility questions for  
the active shooter scenario, by institution and by participation in training. The analysis is  
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then repeated for the hostage scenario in the same sequence. Both scenarios are then  
reviewed together for overall consistency for each set of questions. 
When reviewing the mean consistency in response to all of the personal 
responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario in Figure 6, 19 of the 29 
institutions reported at least an 80% mean consistency rate, while 27 of the 29 institutions 
indicated at least a 75% mean consistency rate. All institutions responded consistently to 
at least 71% of the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario. 
 
Figure 6. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Personal Responsibility Questions for 
the Active Shooter Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training 
at Least Annually by Institution. 
 
When comparing the mean consistency in response for the personal responsibility 
questions to participation in training, the data showed that the level of training provided 
did not indicate that personnel will respond more consistently. Figure 6 indicates that the 
mean percentage of consistency in response for the personal responsibility questions for 
the active shooter scenario was higher for 28 of the 29 institutions than for the percentage 
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who indicated that they participate in training at least annually. While some institutions 
with high consistency rates indicated that they participate in more training, other 
institutions participating in little or no training still had high consistency rates. For 
example, Institution #12 had a mean consistency rate of 91% and a training participation 
rate of 100%. However, Institution #4 had a mean consistency rate of 90% and no 
participation in training. 
Figure 7 indicates that eight of the 29 institutions reported 100% mean 
consistency when responding to the institutional responsibility questions for the active 
shooter scenario. Twenty-six of the 29 institutions responded the same for at least 90% of 
the questions. All institutions responded consistently to at least 82% of the institutional 
responsibility questions. 
Figure 7. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Institutional Responsibility Questions 
for the Active Shooter Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in 
Training at Least Annually by Institution. 
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training provided did not show that personnel will respond more consistently. The mean 
percentage of consistency in response for the institutional responsibility questions for the 
active shooter scenario was higher for 28 of the 29 institutions than for the percentage 
who indicated that they participate in annual training. There are four institutions who 
responded at least 97% consistently to the institutional responsibility questions; however, 
these respondents indicated that they do not participate in annual training. 
Figure 8 indicates that 13 institutions reported consistency in response to at least 
75% of the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. All 29 institutions 
indicated consistency on at least 60% of the personal responsibility questions.  
 
Figure 8. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Personal Responsibility Questions for 
the Hostage Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at 
Least Annually by Institution. 
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27 of the 29 institutions than for the percentage who indicated that they participate in 
training at least annually. The three institutions that reported the highest mean 
consistency in response to the personal responsibility questions have varied training 
participation rates. Institution #15, for example, had 100% mean consistency in response 
to the personal responsibility questions; however, only 50% of the respondents indicated 
that they participate in training at least annually. Institution #9 had 87% consistency in 
response with a higher level of participation in training at 67%. Institution #18 responded 
85% consistently on the personal responsibility questions but only 25% of the 
respondents indicated participation in annual training. 
Thirteen of the 29 institutions reported consensus on all institutional responsibility 
questions for the hostage scenario, while 26 of the institutions responded consistently on 
at least 90% of the questions (see Figure 9). All institutions responded consistently on at 
least 82% of the institutional responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. 
 
Figure 9. Mean Percentage of Consistency for the Institutional Responsibility Questions 
for the Hostage Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at 
Least Annually by Institution. 
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The level of training provided still did not indicate that personnel will respond 
more consistently. The mean percentage of consistency in response for the institutional 
responsibility questions for the hostage scenario was higher for 28 of the 29 institutions 
than for the percentage that indicated that they participate in training at least annually.  
There were four institutions that responded at least 97% consistently to the institutional 
responsibility questions; however, the respondents indicated that they do not participate 
in training on an annual basis at their institutions. 
When reviewing consistency in response to the personal responsibility questions 
for the active shooter and hostage scenarios, Institution #15 reported 100% consistency 
for both. Overall, most institutions had higher mean consistency rates for the active 
shooter scenario as opposed to the hostage scenario as Figure 10 indicates. Additionally, 
the level of participation in annual training was much lower than the mean consistency in 
response to the personal responsibility questions. 
 
     
Figure 10. Mean Percentage of Consistency for all Personal Responsibility Questions and 
Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually by Institution. 
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However, for the institutional responsibility questions, Figure 11 shows that 16 
institutions reported the same mean percentage of consistency for both scenarios. Of the 
remaining institutions, 11 responded more consistently to the hostage questions than the 
active shooter questions. The level of participation in training was much lower than the 
mean consistency in response to the institutional responsibility questions. Only one 
institution (Institution #12) had participation in training that was comparable to 
consistency in response to the institutional responsibility questions. 
 
Figure 11. Mean Percentage of Consistency for all Institutional Responsibility Questions 
and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually by 
Institution. 
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seen primarily as an indication that the relationship between training and the consistency 
of employee responses to crisis situations may not be related and demands further 
investigation.   
Null Hypothesis #2 
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. 
This hypothesis looked specifically at the accuracy of response to 16 of the 
personal responsibility questions for the active shooter and hostage scenarios. Twenty-
four institutions included an active shooter situation in their emergency management 
plans, while 15 institutions referenced a hostage situation in their plans. This hypothesis 
focused exclusively on the personal responsibility questions because the researcher 
discovered that many of the emergency management documents did not identify how to 
respond to the institutional responsibility questions. 
Figure 12 shows that 13 of the 24 institutions responded with at least 85% mean 
accuracy to the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario, and 19 of 
the 24 institutions responded with at least 75% accuracy. The lowest percentage of mean 
accuracy in response to the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter 
scenario was 64%. 
Data demonstrated that the level of training provided did not indicate that 
personnel will respond more accurately. Only Institution #12 reported a higher 
percentage of participation in training than the mean percentage of accuracy to the 
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personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario. Two institutions, #2 and 
#4, reported 89% and 93% accuracy, respectively, with no participation in training. 
However, the two institutions with the lowest mean percentage of accuracy, #10 and #21, 
with 70% and 64% respectively, also indicated no participation in training. 
 
Figure 12. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Personal Responsibility Questions for 
the Active Shooter Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training 
at Least Annually by Institution. 
Figure 13 indicates a wider range of distribution on mean accuracy in response to 
the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. The percentage of mean 
accuracy ranged from 50% to 100%. Ten of the 15 institutions responded with at least 
75% accuracy.  
Participation in training did not indicate that personnel will respond more 
accurately to the personal responsibility questions for the hostage scenario. No 
institutions indicated a higher percentage of participation in training than the mean 
percentage of accuracy to the personal responsibility questions. Institutions #24 and #7 
89
77
93
87
90 91 91
86
70
88 88
82
88 87
79
64
81
74 73
87
81 83
75 74
0
25
0
36
70
20
25
67
0
100
20
50
62
20 22
0
33
50
38
30
71
38
30
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 15 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Institution
Accuracy
Training
87 
 
reported a mean accuracy of 100% and 90% respectively, with only 38% and 20% 
participation in annual training. However, Institution #3 only reported a 50% mean 
accuracy with 25% participation in annual training. There were also three institutions that  
reported 80% mean accuracy with participation in training ranging from 20% to 70%.  
 
 
Figure 13. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Personal Responsibility Questions for 
the Hostage Scenario and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at 
Least Annually by Institution. 
 
These results indicate that Null Hypothesis #2 failed to be rejected. Personnel at 
higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that 
includes training did not respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents 
than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that did not include training. Because of the issues discussed earlier 
related to rates of response, the fact that this null hypothesis failed to be rejected must be 
seen primarily as an indication that the relationship between training and the accuracy of 
employee responses to crisis situations may not be related and demands further 
investigation. 
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Null Hypothesis #3 
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA 
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at 
higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does 
not include training. 
 The following tables identify institutions that indicated that they strongly agreed 
or agreed that information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to: Figure 14, 
Dave‟s parents; Figure 15, colleagues; and Figure 16, students, accompanied by rates of 
participation in annual training.  
Figure 14 indicates that the mean percentage who reported that they strongly 
agreed or agreed that information may be released to Dave‟s parents (the correct 
response) ranged from 0% to 60%. Only five institutions reported a mean percentage of 
50% or above, while 10 institutions indicated a mean percentage of 25% or below.  
 
Figure 14. Mean Percentage Who Indicated That FERPA Allows Them to Release 
Information to Dave‟s Parents and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in 
Training at Least Annually by Institution. 
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Eleven of the 29 institutions had a higher percentage of individuals who 
participate in annual training than the mean percentage of institutions who strongly 
agreed or agreed that information may be released to Dave‟s parents. Chapter 5 further 
discusses the significance of this finding since FERPA permits the release of this 
information. 
The mean percentage who reported that FERPA allowed them to release 
information about Dave‟s behavior to their colleagues was higher than the mean 
percentage who indicated that they may release information to Dave‟s parents. Figure 15 
shows the mean percentage of individuals who strongly agreed or agreed ranged from 0% 
to 91%. Twenty-one of the 29 institutions indicated a mean percentage of at least 50% 
who strongly agreed or agreed that they may release information to their colleagues; in  
this case, the correct response. Two institutions, #13 and #15, both reported that no 
information may be released to their colleagues. 
 
 
Figure 15. Mean Percentage Who Indicated That FERPA Allows Them to Release 
Information to Their Colleagues and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in 
Training at Least Annually by Institution. 
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Only seven institutions had a higher percentage of individuals who participate in 
annual training than the mean percentage of institutions who strongly agreed or agreed 
that information may be released to their colleagues. Chapter 5 further discusses the 
significance of this finding since FERPA permits the release of this information.    
Figure 16 indicates that a much lower percentage of institutions reported that they 
may release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to students. The mean percentage 
who responded that they strongly agreed or agreed (the correct response) ranged from 0% 
to 43%. Four institutions unanimously agreed that no information may be released to 
students, while 11 institutions reported at least 25% agreement that information may be 
released. 
 
 
Figure 16. Mean Percentage Who Indicated That FERPA Allows Them to Release 
Information to Students and Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at 
Least Annually by Institution. 
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regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to students. Since FERPA permits the release 
of information, training is not effective in educating administrators, faculty, and staff on 
the nuances of FERPA.  
The above results indicate that Null Hypothesis #3 failed to be rejected. Based on 
the data analyzed, personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards 
emergency management plan that includes training did not have more knowledge of 
FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel 
at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that did 
not include training. Since response rates for each personnel group and institution did not 
provide numbers that uniformly yielded statistically reliable data, the failure to reject this 
null hypothesis must be seen only as an indication that training is not adequately 
preparing employees to understand FERPA requirements, and this question demands 
further study. 
Null Hypothesis #4 
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents 
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the 
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than 
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include 
training. 
 This hypothesis reviewed consistency in response by classification, which 
includes administrators, faculty, and staff. Figure 17 indicates that the mean consistency 
percentage for each classification was very similar and only varied between 4% and 7% 
within each type of question.  
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For the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA questions, 
administrators, faculty, and staff responded most consistently to the institutional 
responsibility questions with mean percentages ranging from 92% to 96%. All three 
groups responded least consistently to the FERPA questions with mean percentages 
ranging from 60% to 67%. Overall, faculty members reported the highest mean 
percentage of consistency for the institutional responsibility and FERPA questions, while 
staff members reported the highest mean consistency rate for the personal responsibility 
questions. 
 
Figure 17. Mean Percentage Who Responded Consistently by Classification. 
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Figure 18. Percentage Who Participate in Annual Training by Classification (includes 
strongly agree and agree responses). 
 
The results indicate that based on the data available, Null Hypothesis #4 failed to 
be rejected. There was not more consistency in response to potential campus safety 
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when 
the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than  
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not include  
training. Again, support of this null hypothesis is based on data that were compromised 
by a low response rate by one of the employee groups – staff.  To be able to conclusively 
test this null hypothesis, this study needs to be replicated with data that proportionately 
represent the three employee divisions.    
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plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management 
plans that do not include training. 
 FERPA permits the release of information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his 
parents, colleagues, and students. Administrators reported the highest mean percentage of 
accuracy for each group of individuals to whom information may be released (see Figure 
19). Sixty-nine percent of administrators indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed 
that information may be released to Dave‟s parents, 77% responded that information may 
be shared with colleagues, and 43% reported that information may be released to 
students. Faculty indicated the lowest mean percentage of accuracy for Dave‟s parents, 
colleagues, and students, with 13%, 48%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 19. FERPA Allows Me to Release Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the 
Following Individuals (includes strongly agree and agree responses). 
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training as part of their institution‟s emergency management plan, followed by staff, and 
then faculty.  
As Figure 20 reports, while 69% of administrators indicated that information 
regarding Dave‟s behavior may be shared with Dave‟s parents, 61% strongly agreed or 
agreed that they participate in training at least annually. Of the 77% who strongly agreed 
or agreed that information may be released to their colleagues, 61% participate in training 
exercises. Administrators were least likely to release information to students. While 43% 
reported that information may be shared with students, 67% reported participation in 
annual training. 
 
Figure 20. Administrators Who Strongly Agree or Agree That FERPA Allows Them to 
Release Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the Following Individuals and 
Percentage of Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually. 
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information, only 28% participate in training. Only 10% of faculty strongly agreed or 
agreed that they would release information to students; however, 29% participate in 
annual training exercises. 
 
Figure 21. Faculty Who Strongly Agree or Agree That FERPA Allows Them to Release 
Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the Following Individuals and Percentage of 
Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually. 
 
Staff members indicated greater participation in training than faculty. Figure 22 
indicates that while 58% of staff would release information to Dave‟s parents, 50% 
participate in annual training as part of their emergency management plan. Of the 71% 
who strongly agreed or agreed that information may be shared with colleagues, 59% 
engage in annual training. Staff members were also least likely to release information to 
students. While 38% indicated that information may be shared with students, 67% 
participate in annual training.  
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Figure 22. Staff Who Strongly Agree or Agree That FERPA Allows Them to Release 
Information Regarding Dave's Behavior to the Following Individuals and Percentage of 
Respondents Who Participate in Training at Least Annually. 
 
Null Hypothesis #5 is rejected. Data indicated that administrators who participate 
in annual training as part of their emergency management plans have more knowledge of 
FERPA regulations, followed by staff, and then faculty. Therefore, there is more 
knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents 
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the 
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than 
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not include 
training. Since the response rate for staff was lower than that desired for valid statistical 
analysis, conclusions about staff can only be inferred for this null hypothesis, and further 
study is needed to confirm this relationship between training and knowledge about 
FERPA. 
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Null Hypothesis #6 
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not 
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-
administrative positions. 
 This hypothesis specifically looked at accuracy of response for the personal 
responsibility questions by administrators as compared to non-administrators (faculty and 
staff). For the active shooter scenario, responses for 21 institutions are displayed. For the 
hostage scenario, responses for 15 institutions are presented. The numbers vary based on 
the number of plans available that addressed the specific scenarios. Additionally, there 
may not have been any administrators who completed the survey at some of the 
participating institutions.    
Figure 23 shows that for the active shooter scenario, administrators responded 
more accurately at 10 institutions, while non-administrators responded more accurately  
at the remaining 11 institutions. The mean percentage of accuracy for administrators 
ranged from 57% to 100%. Administrators at 14 institutions reported a mean percentage 
of accuracy of at least 80% for the active shooter scenario. For non-administrators, the 
mean percentage ranged from 64% to 94%. Non-administrators at 15 institutions reported 
a mean percentage of accuracy of at least 80%. The smallest variation between 
administrators and non-administrators at one institution was 1%, while the largest 
difference was 20%. 
Figure 24 identifies the mean percentage of accuracy for the hostage scenario for 
administrators and non-administrators. Administrators responded with the highest mean 
percentage of accuracy at five institutions, non-administrators reported the highest mean 
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percentage of accuracy at nine institutions, and at one institution, administrators and non-
administrators tied with 100% accuracy on all questions. The mean percentage of 
accuracy ranged from 25% to 100% for administrators and from 42% to 100% for non-
administrators. Administrators at five institutions responded with at least 80% mean 
accuracy for the hostage scenario, while non-administrators at seven institutions reported 
at least 80% mean accuracy.  
 
Figure 23. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Active Shooter Scenario by 
Classification. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Mean Percentage of Accuracy for the Hostage Scenario by Classification. 
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Based on the findings, Null Hypothesis #6 failed to be rejected. Personnel in 
administrative positions at higher education institutions did not respond more accurately 
to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-administrative positions. 
Response rates by administrators in this study and by institution were such that this 
statistical analysis can be viewed as valid.  
Comments Received About Research 
 The researcher received a variety of comments from both respondents and  
non-respondents regarding her study. The topic of campus safety causes concern for 
some individuals and institutions and clearly limited the individuals who were willing  
to participate. For example, one employee who was on the request list felt it was 
inappropriate for him as the Campus Police Chief to complete the survey because his 
institution is not fully prepared to deal with the types of scenarios presented in the survey. 
Another respondent indicated that she completed the survey but struggled because her 
institution does not have an emergency management plan in place. A third noted that 
closed-ended questions made it difficult to respond to some questions and that open-
ended responses would have been helpful. One respondent expressed concern about how 
the questions were worded and how the data would be used. He indicated that there are 
many variables associated with each type of incident and that situational factors may 
dictate how to respond. Also, one individual asked to be removed from the study. Nine 
individuals who were invited to participate asked the researcher if the survey was 
intended for him/her and/or alerted the researcher that they had forwarded the survey to 
another individual who was more knowledgeable. One respondent indicated that 
originally he was not sure if he qualified to complete the survey.  
101 
 
Additionally, three respondents expressed some confusion about the wording of 
the FERPA questions, specifically if the researcher was referring to Dave‟s behavior as in 
the moment of the violent incidents vs. generally before or after an incident occurred. 
Another respondent noted that there were no questions about behavioral intervention 
teams included in the survey. As noted in Chapter 3, four institutions chose not to 
participate in this study. One institution advised that they were in the process of 
reviewing their emergency management plan and would not be good research subjects. 
Another institution indicated that they were uncomfortable with the content of the 
questions and how it relates to identifying readiness to respond to campus violence. A 
third institution advised that their schedule would not allow participation. The final 
institution would not provide a reason for declining to participate. 
The researcher also received several favorable comments about her research. 
Many individuals expressed interest in the study and its findings and look forward to 
reading the results of this survey or listening to a presentation of the results. 
Summary 
 This chapter provided a detailed description of the participants in this research 
study, a review of the survey instrument and its internal reliability, and how the 
researcher dealt with missing data. The General Linear Model – multivariate analysis 
with multiple criterion variables was used to analyze data and identify relationships 
between dependent and/or independent variables. Crosstabulations and case summaries 
were analyzed to decide whether to reject or fail to reject the null hypotheses. Based upon 
these data: 
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Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. Failed to be 
rejected. 
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. Failed to be 
rejected. 
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA 
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at 
higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does 
not include training. Failed to be rejected. 
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents 
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the 
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than 
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include 
training. Failed to be rejected. 
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to 
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher 
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management 
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plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management 
plans that do not include training. Rejected. 
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not 
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-
administrative positions. Failed to be rejected. 
Because response rates by both employee groups and institutions were too low in 
some cases to allow for full statistical validity, the failure to reject Null Hypothesis #1 
through #4 cannot be viewed as definite evidence that the null hypotheses are true. Nor 
can Hypothesis #5 be viewed as definitely false. The study does provide evidence, 
however, that there is a questionable relationship between training and employee 
knowledge of all-hazards emergency management plans, and additional research is 
needed to determine if training, as now provided, is of any value.         
Chapter 5 summarizes and analyzes the results of this research, provides 
recommendations to institutions and other stakeholders about emergency management 
planning, and suggests additional research that could expand on or clarify these findings. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides an overview of this research study, including a brief 
summary, purpose statement, statement of the problem, null hypotheses, and 
methodology. The major findings from the research are presented and analyzed, 
including a discussion of uncontrolled variables and limitations, followed by conclusions 
and recommendations for future research.  
Summary of the Study 
Campus violence is a reality to institutions of higher education. The days of 
feeling completely safe and secure while attending a college or university no longer exist. 
Many campus violence incidents have occurred over the past 50 years, most notably the 
Virginia Tech tragedy in 2007 where 32 students and faculty lost their lives in the 
nation‟s worst mass shooting. These campus violence incidents brought to light a number 
of concerns related to campus safety and emergency preparedness, including concerns 
about comprehensive training for faculty, staff, and students and adherence to privacy 
laws. This research study focused on the preparedness level of administrators, faculty, 
and staff at public higher education institutions in Missouri to respond to potential 
campus safety incidents.  
Purpose Statement 
This research study reported the relationship between active faculty/staff 
participation in training exercises as part of implementation of an all-hazards emergency 
management plan and the consistency and accuracy of response to potential campus 
safety incidents in higher education. The study also identified the relationship between 
implementation of an all-hazards emergency management plan that includes faculty/staff 
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participation in training exercises and knowledge of the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents 
in higher education.  
The purpose of this study was to provide research that allows colleges and 
universities to determine if training is effective, and if employees who say they have been 
trained actually indicate that they know the institution‟s emergency management plan and 
would respond appropriately when presented with potential campus safety incidents. The 
findings of this study reform the discussion related to the effectiveness of planning and 
training in preparing a college community for a violent situation. The findings also enable 
the researcher to make more general observations about the state of emergency 
management planning among institutions of higher education, based upon the wide 
variations in sophistication and complexity of the plans studied. It is important to note 
that due to low response rates in some cases, some of the findings, especially related to 
training, may not be representative of the institution as a whole. 
Statement of the Problem 
Virtually everyone working in higher education today is aware of the potentiality 
of a violent campus incident, and most institutions now have an all-hazards emergency 
management plan in place. Yet little research has been performed that examines the 
amount of training college employees receive related to the plans, the degree of 
understanding faculty and staff have of the requirements of the plans, and the consistency 
with which they are understood across campus. Since a plan is no better than an 
institution‟s ability to implement it, a plan that is poorly or inconsistently understood will 
have limited value in case of a campus emergency. Research is critically needed to 
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determine how well the myriad of all-hazards emergency management plans have been 
assimilated into the culture of the institutions they are designed to protect. 
Null Hypotheses 
The following null hypotheses were used to guide this research study. 
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to 
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions 
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.  
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to 
potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions 
with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. 
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA 
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel 
at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan 
that does not include training. 
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety 
incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions 
when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include 
training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that 
do not include training. 
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding 
to potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various 
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higher education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency 
management plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards 
emergency management plans that do not include training. 
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not 
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in 
non-administrative positions. 
Methodology  
The participants in this research study were selected from public two-year and 
four-year colleges and universities in Missouri. The researcher selected participants who 
should be directly involved and have knowledge of their institution‟s all-hazards 
emergency management plan. Participants included the following from each college or 
university, assuming the institution has the position: president, chief academic officer, 
dean of student services/student affairs, registrar, faculty members, public safety 
director/chief of police, public safety officer, health/mental health professional, human 
resource director, housing director, and emergency preparedness contact person.  
A web-based survey, designed by the researcher, was used to collect data. The 
survey included two scenarios, each followed by a series of statements related to personal 
and institutional responsibility. The two scenarios presented to participants were as 
follows: 
Scenario #1: Dave, a student, brings a gun to school and is seen with the weapon 
on campus. As Brian, another student, is telling you that Dave has a gun, you hear 
what sounds like shots fired in an adjoining hallway in your building. 
Scenario #2: Situation escalates. Dave takes a classroom of students and their 
instructor hostage. 
108 
 
After the second scenario was presented, the survey included statements regarding federal 
regulations for which respondents were asked to indicate levels of agreement. 
Participants were also asked to respond to general statements regarding personal and 
institutional practices related to all-hazards emergency management planning and 
training. Participants were requested to answer the survey without referencing their 
institution‟s emergency management plan. The study utilized a five-point Likert scale, 
with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The instrument also 
collected demographic information related to each participant and took approximately 10 
minutes for participants to complete.  
From the beginning of this study, the researcher consulted with Missouri‟s 
Commissioner of Higher Education and the Higher Education Subcommittee of the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council. On behalf of the Higher Education Subcommittee, 
the Commissioner agreed to write a letter of support for this study (see Appendix B) 
which was provided as a link in the e-mail that was sent from the researcher to each 
administrator, faculty, or staff member asking for his/her participation. This letter 
encouraged a higher response rate than might be expected without this endorsement and 
request, especially from administrators. 
The study employed a quantitative research design, with the dependent variables 
including the responses to each of the personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, 
and FERPA questions. These responses assisted in identifying the consistency of 
response to potential campus safety incidents, accuracy of response to potential campus 
safety incidents, and knowledge level of FERPA regulations. The independent variables 
included responses to the emergency management planning and training questions as well 
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as various demographic factors including position, classification of position, status as 
emergency management coordinator at his/her institution, employment at a two-year or 
four-year institution, name of institution, number of years in current position, number of 
years in profession, highest degree earned, gender, and age.  
 The General Linear Model (GLM) – multivariate analysis with multiple criterion 
variables was used to analyze data and served to identify what independent variables 
were significant in the presence of all dependent variables. Additionally, this statistical 
tool allowed the researcher to use between-subjects effects to determine if a relationship 
existed between the dependent variables and each of the significant independent 
variables. Data were also analyzed using crosstabulations and case summaries.  
Crosstabulations were used to identify relationships between dependent variables and/or 
independent variables. For example, crosstabulations were used to determine consistency 
in response for all personal responsibility, institutional responsibility, and FERPA 
questions by institution and by classification. Crosstabulations also served to identify 
how institutions responded to various demographic and emergency management 
independent variables. The study utilized case summaries to identify the accuracy in 
response for the personal responsibility and FERPA questions by institution and by 
classification within institution. 
Summary of the Major Findings 
This research addressed significant gaps in the literature; first by indicating how 
well emergency management plans are understood and can be followed at colleges and 
universities when presented with potential campus safety incidents, and second by 
addressing how well employees are educated in the nuances of FERPA when considering 
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incidents of campus violence. Following is a summary of the major findings of this 
research study.  
Emergency Management Plans 
The literature stresses the importance of having a comprehensive emergency 
management plan that includes clear and consistent guidelines (Rollo and Zdziarski, 
2007). One of the criticisms of Virginia Tech was that their institution‟s emergency 
management plan did not include response to an active shooter situation (Virginia Tech 
Review Panel, 2007). This research study demonstrated that by standards recommended 
following the Virginia Tech incident, not all emergency management plans are 
comprehensive in Missouri, and employees at even fewer colleges are aware of the 
degree of instruction provided by their plans. The researcher discovered that of the 27 
emergency management plans reviewed, 89% included information on how to respond to 
an active shooter situation, while 56% of plans addressed a hostage situation. However, 
participants were not very knowledgeable about these inclusions, especially the hostage 
situation, and some indicated that their plan included response to a campus violence 
situation when in actuality, it did not. Seventy percent of respondents were at least 50% 
accurate regarding the inclusion of an active shooter situation in their emergency 
management plan, and only 37% were at least 50% accurate regarding the inclusion of a 
hostage situation. Therefore, many respondents were not aware of what information is 
included in their institution‟s emergency management plan. Additionally, the researcher 
found little information pertaining to institutional responsibilities in the event of a 
campus safety incident. Few plans addressed the proper protocol for communication and 
lockdown procedures when a campus safety incident occurs. 
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In addition to the lack of comprehensiveness of emergency management plans, 
there were inconsistencies in the plans. A variety of emergency management guidelines 
existed for both community colleges and four-year colleges and universities in the state, 
including full-scale plans, brochures, quick reference guides, flip charts, and 
informational web pages. The documents ranged from one page to over 40 pages and 
were referred to by various names, including emergency management plans, emergency 
action plans, emergency operations plans, emergency response plans, emergency 
response guides, campus emergency preparedness guides, emergency procedures, and 
crisis management plans. With this broad variation in the comprehensiveness of planning 
documents and because emergency management plans are specifically designed for each 
institution, a set of best practices for plans could prove very beneficial for our higher 
education institutions. 
To be fully effective, an emergency management plan needs to be shared with all 
employees at a higher education institution. Data showed that 18% of respondents 
indicated that they were not aware that their institution had an emergency management 
plan.  
While most emergency management plans appear to have been updated since the 
Virginia Tech shootings, the researcher discovered that some plans were very outdated. 
Three plans in particular caught the researcher‟s attention. In addition to lacking 
comprehensiveness, the first plan did not specifically address how to respond to various 
types of crisis situations. General information was included in the plan which was 
expected to apply to the many types of incidents that may occur on a college campus. 
Since each crisis has different requirements and needs, the researcher finds it very 
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difficult to use a “one size fits all approach” with emergency management planning. The 
next two plans provided sufficient detail on how to respond to various crisis situations 
such as fires, tornados, etc. However, there was no direction on how to respond to any 
type of campus violence incident. As prevalent as campus shootings have been over the 
last few years, it was very surprising that plans have not been updated to include 
guidance for responding to this potentially life-saving type of crisis situation.    
Training 
The U.S. Department of Education (2007) stressed the importance of training in 
order to successfully implement an emergency management plan. The literature indicated 
that training was occurring more frequently since the Virginia Tech tragedy (Kennedy, 
2008). However, participants in this research did not agree. The data indicated there was 
a lack of training that occurs at the public higher education institutions in Missouri. Only 
35% of participants strongly agreed or agreed that they participate in training and/or drills 
related to campus violence incidents at least annually. Administrators indicated the 
greatest participation in training, followed by staff, and then faculty who indicated 
participation in the least amount of training.  
Data indicated that mandatory training related to campus violence occurs on a 
limited basis; however, it occurs more frequently for full-time employees than part-time 
employees. Respondents reported that 37% of administrators, 27% of full-time staff, and 
26% of full-time faculty participate in mandatory training, while only 17% of part-time 
staff, 15% of part-time faculty, and 14% of student workers participate in mandatory 
training. 
The premise of this study was that institutions that participate in training exercises 
as part of their emergency management plan will be better prepared to respond to campus 
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violence incidents. The data reported that participation in training did not indicate that an 
institution was better prepared to respond to potential campus safety incidents. Five of the 
six hypotheses in this research suggested that training will result in more consistency and 
accuracy of response as well as greater knowledge of FERPA regulations, yet the 
following review of hypotheses indicates that only one of the null hypotheses was 
rejected.    
Null Hypothesis #1 
Ho1: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more consistently to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training.  
 The data from this study supported this null hypothesis. Overall, there was a 
higher percentage of consistency in response to the institutional responsibility questions 
than to the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter and the hostage 
scenarios, even though many of the emergency management plans did not address the 
institutional responsibility questions. For both the active shooter and hostage scenarios, 
the mean percentage of consistency for the institutional responsibility questions ranged 
from 82% to 100% with a mean of 95% for the active shooter scenario and a mean of 
96% for the hostage scenario. This was much higher than the mean percentage of 
consistency for the personal responsibility questions, which ranged from 71% to 100% 
for the active shooter scenario with a mean of 83% and from 60% to 100% for the 
hostage scenario with a mean of 75%.   
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 Without further study, the researcher can only speculate as to why consistency of 
response to institutional responsibility questions was so high among employees whose 
plans did not address these circumstances. One possibility is that the institutional 
responsibility questions may be less controversial and less prone to uncertainty. It may be 
simpler to determine how the institution as a whole should respond than to determine 
what any specific individual should do. It may also be the case that exposure to the 
significant media coverage given to incidents such as the Virginia Tech shootings has 
provided a de facto „universal‟ training for the public as to how institutions should 
respond in this type of crisis. A third possibility is that training is occurring in formats 
other than through on-campus programs, such as statewide or national workshops or 
through publications read by employees – both training measures that this study did not 
evaluate.  
 Based on participant responses, participation in training provided through the 
emergency management plan did not affect the consistency of response for the active 
shooter and hostage scenarios in this study. There was much variation when reviewing 
the level of training that participants indicated they received and the consistency of 
response. For example, 18 of the 29 institutions reported at least an 80% mean percentage 
of consistency on the personal responsibility questions for the active shooter scenario. 
However, participants at 11 of the 18 institutions indicated that only 30% or fewer 
participate in training exercises related to campus violence at least annually. The hostage 
scenario presented the same picture. While 13 institutions reported at least a 75% mean 
percentage of consistency on the personal responsibility questions, seven of these 
institutions indicated that 25% or fewer participate in training. 
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Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #1 failed to be rejected. Personnel at 
higher education institutions in Missouri with an all-hazards emergency management 
plan that includes training did not respond more consistently to potential campus safety 
incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that did not include training. Although mean consistency rates were at 
least 75% for both scenarios, further research should be conducted with more 
representative rates of participation in institutional training to re-evaluate the impact of 
training on consistency of response to potential campus safety incidents at higher 
education institutions. 
Null Hypothesis #2 
Ho2: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not respond more accurately to potential 
campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education institutions with an all-
hazards emergency management plan that does not include training. 
 Accuracy of response focused exclusively on the personal responsibility questions 
since most plans did not include information about institutional responsibility and was 
slightly higher for the active shooter scenario than the hostage scenario. The mean 
percentage of accuracy for the active shooter scenario ranged from 64% to 93% with a 
mean of 79%. The mean percentage of accuracy for the hostage scenario ranged from 
50% to 100% with a mean of 76%. A plausible explanation for greater accuracy in 
response is that more emergency management plans addressed an active shooter situation 
than a hostage situation. Here again, it is also possible that a universal training 
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phenomenon has occurred through public discussion about high profile campus shooting 
incidents, while less has been written and discussed in the media about hostage situations.  
 Based on participant responses, participation in training did not indicate that 
personnel will respond more accurately to the active shooter or hostage scenarios. Two 
institutions with a high mean percentage (93% and 89%) of accuracy and two institutions 
with the lowest mean percentage (70% and 64%) of accuracy for the active shooter 
scenario all indicated no participation in training exercises. There was as much variation 
for the hostage scenario. While one institution indicated a 92% mean accuracy with 67% 
participation in training, another institution reported a 90% mean accuracy with 20% 
participation in training. The one institution that indicated 100% accuracy in response 
only reported 38% participation in training.  
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #2 failed to be rejected. Personnel at 
higher education institutions in Missouri with an all-hazards emergency management 
plan that includes training did not respond more accurately to potential campus safety 
incidents than personnel at institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan 
that did not include training. Although mean accuracy rates were at least 75% for both 
scenarios, further research should be conducted with more representative rates of 
participation in institutional training to re-evaluate the impact of training on accuracy of 
response to potential campus safety incidents at higher education institutions. 
Null Hypothesis #3 
Ho3: Personnel at higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency 
management plan that includes training will not have more knowledge of FERPA 
regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at 
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higher education institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that does 
not include training. 
 The Virginia Tech tragedy demonstrated that FERPA was not well understood 
across campus. Faculty members did not share information about their concerns with 
Cho‟s behavior with his parents or their colleagues (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). 
The Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) stated “Information privacy laws are intended to 
strike a balance between protecting privacy and allowing information sharing that is 
necessary or desirable. Because of this difficult balance, the laws are often complex and 
hard to understand” (p. 63). The Review Panel expressed concern about the lack of 
understanding of FERPA and the inconsistent practice when applying privacy laws.  
FERPA causes much concern for employees of higher education institutions who 
feel vulnerable to public sanction if they release information concerning students in 
violation of federal law. This research showed that many individuals are still unfamiliar 
with the provisions of FERPA and what information may be released. The questions in 
this research asked if information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to his 
parents, to colleagues, and to students. In all cases, the answer is yes. Behavior that is 
observed and not part of a student‟s educational record may be released. As stated by the 
Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007): 
Nothing in FERPA prohibits a school official from sharing with parents 
information that is based on that official‟s personal knowledge or observation and 
that is not based on information contained in an education record. Therefore, 
FERPA would not prohibit a teacher or other school official from letting a parent 
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know of their concern about their son or daughter that is based on their personal 
knowledge or observation. (p. H-7)  
Furthermore, if a situation rises to the level of an emergency that impacts the health 
and/or safety of faculty, staff, or students, FERPA allows the release of confidential 
information from a student‟s educational record (FERPA, 2008). The Virginia Tech 
Review Panel proposed that additional flexibility and clarification be allowed with the 
emergency exception of FERPA. In January of 2009, the Department of Education 
updated FERPA regulations in an effort to provide more definitive language as to when 
an institution may release confidential student information. A small portion of the 
updated regulations follows: 
An educational agency or institution may take into account the totality of the 
circumstances pertaining to a threat to the health or safety of a student or other 
individuals. If the educational agency or institution determines that there is an 
articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of a student or other 
individuals, it may disclose information from education records to any person 
whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of 
the student or other individuals. (FERPA, 2008, p. 74854) 
Even though FERPA regulations have been updated to provide more guidance, 
employees are still uncomfortable with the ambiguity of FERPA and are very hesitant to 
release information. This research demonstrated this finding. Participants were not 
comfortable releasing information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his parents, to 
colleagues, and to students. Although mean percentages were low, participants were most 
comfortable releasing information to their colleagues (56%), followed by Dave‟s parents 
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(31%), and then students (20%). This hesitation may well be a reflection of the constant 
emphasis that is placed by higher education institutions on student privacy, with a general 
proviso that the law is less restrictive when it comes to sharing information within the 
academic setting for legitimate educational purposes. Respondents would therefore be 
more inclined to feel that information could be shared with colleagues.  
Based on participant responses, participation in training did not indicate that 
personnel will have more knowledge of FERPA regulations. Although training 
participation levels ranged from 0% to 100%, there was much inconsistency in response. 
The one institution that indicated 100% participation in training was most likely to 
release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to colleagues (60%), followed by students 
(20%), and then parents (0%). Another institution reported 79% participation in training 
and had much higher percentages that were willing to release information, with 73% 
indicating that they would release information concerning Dave‟s behavior to their 
colleagues, 60% to Dave‟s parents, followed by 40% who would release information to 
students. An institution with 71% participation in training had 57% agreement to release 
information to colleagues, followed by 43% who would release information to Dave‟s 
parents and to students. 
 There were also five institutions where respondents reported no participation in 
training. At four of the five institutions, respondents were much more willing to release 
information to their colleagues with percentages of agreement ranging from 56% to 83%. 
At three of the five institutions, participants were more likely to release information to 
Dave‟s parents than to students, where percentages ranged from 29% to 40%. In 
summary, while there was most agreement that information regarding Dave‟s behavior 
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may be released to colleagues, there was still not consensus that FERPA permits this 
release of information, and training showed no effect on correct response.  
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #3 failed to be rejected. Personnel at 
higher education institutions in Missouri with an all-hazards emergency management 
plan that includes training did not have more knowledge of FERPA regulations when 
responding to potential campus safety incidents than personnel at higher education 
institutions with an all-hazards emergency management plan that did not include training. 
Many college employees receive some training related to FERPA from college colloquia, 
from professional meetings, and from publications related to their disciplines. It is quite 
possible that this training which emphasizes caution in releasing student information to 
anyone is generalized by employees to include crisis situations. Further research should 
be conducted with more representative rates of participation in institutional training to  
re-evaluate the impact of training on knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding 
to potential campus safety incidents at higher education institutions. 
Null Hypothesis #4 
Ho4: There will not be more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents 
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions when the 
institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than 
institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that do not include 
training. 
Overall, faculty in the study provided the most consistent responses; however, 
they reported the least amount of training at 23%. Administrators indicated the greatest 
participation in training at 58% but did not respond most consistently on any category of 
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the questions. When looking specifically at personal responsibility, institutional 
responsibility, and FERPA questions by classification, all responses in each group of 
questions did not differ by more than 7%. For the personal responsibility questions, mean 
responses ranged from 78% to 82% with staff reporting the greatest consistency. Faculty 
reported the highest mean consistency for the institutional responsibility questions with 
responses ranging from 92% to 96%. For the FERPA questions, mean responses ranged 
from 60% to 67% with faculty, once again, reporting the greatest consistency.  
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #4 failed to be rejected. There was 
not more consistency in response to potential campus safety incidents by personnel in 
similar positions at various higher education institutions in Missouri when the institutions 
have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training than institutions that 
have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not include training. Further 
research should be conducted with more representative rates of participation in 
institutional training to re-evaluate the impact of training on consistency of response 
among personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions. 
Null Hypothesis #5 
Ho5: There will not be more knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to 
potential campus safety incidents by personnel in similar positions at various higher 
education institutions when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management 
plans that include training than institutions that have all-hazards emergency management 
plans that do not include training. 
Administrators responding to the survey had the greatest knowledge of FERPA 
regulations and reported the greatest participation in training (58%) as part of their 
emergency management plan. Seventy-seven percent of administrators agreed that 
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information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be released to their colleagues, followed by 
69% who agreed that information may be shared with Dave‟s parents, and 43% who 
indicated that information may be released to students. Staff members indicated the 
second highest participation in annual training (50%) and also reported the second 
greatest level of knowledge of FERPA regulations. Seventy-one percent of staff members 
indicated that information regarding Dave‟s behavior may be shared with their 
colleagues, followed by Dave‟s parents at 58%, and then students at 38%. Faculty 
members reported the least agreement that information regarding Dave‟s behavior may 
be released and also indicated the lowest level of participation in training (23%). While 
48% of faculty members indicated agreement that they may release information to their 
colleagues, only 13% indicated agreement to release information to Dave‟s parents, 
followed by 10% to students. 
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #5 is rejected. There is more 
knowledge of FERPA regulations when responding to potential campus safety incidents 
by personnel in similar positions at various higher education institutions in Missouri 
when the institutions have all-hazards emergency management plans that include training 
than at institutions that have all-hazards emergency management plans that did not 
include training.  
Based on participant responses, the findings discussed above indicate that training 
does not increase the consistency or accuracy of responses to questions concerning how 
an individual or institution should respond to a campus crisis situation. However, 
research results in this study do support the value of training in informing employees 
about FERPA. These results suggest that colleges and universities should commence 
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and/or update training programs related to FERPA at their respective institutions as soon 
as possible and should require this training of all faculty and staff.   
Null Hypothesis #6 
Ho6: Personnel in administrative positions at higher education institutions will not 
respond more accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-
administrative positions. 
Overall, non-administrators responded more accurately to questions concerning a 
potential campus safety incident than did administrators. For the active shooter scenario, 
administrators responded more accurately at 10 institutions, while non-administrators 
responded more accurately at 11 institutions. Accuracy for administrators ranged from 
57% to 100%, while accuracy for non-administrators ranged from 64% to 94%. For the 
hostage scenario, non-administrators responded more accurately at nine institutions, 
while administrators responded more accurately at five institutions. Administrators and 
non-administrators both reported 100% accuracy on all personal responsibility questions 
at one institution. Accuracy ranged from 25% to 100% for administrators and from 42% 
to 100% for non-administrators.  
Based on the above results, Null Hypothesis #6 failed to be rejected. Personnel in 
administrative positions at higher education institutions in Missouri did not respond more 
accurately to potential campus safety incidents than personnel in non-administrative 
positions. Since the response rate by administrators was 75% in this study, the researcher 
is confident in the statistical validity of this analysis. Further research should be 
conducted to determine what interventions can ensure that all personnel are responding 
accurately to potential campus safety incidents. 
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Uncontrolled Variables and Limitations  
 There were several variables that were not under the control of the researcher 
during this study, and there was no way to know the exact impact that these variables had 
on the study. It is believed, however, that the results have not been altered significantly. 
Following is a list of these variables. 
1. There was no mechanism to control if participants referenced their 
institution‟s emergency management plan when responding to the survey. 
This could have affected the percentage of accurate responses to the personal 
responsibility questions. 
2. There was a much higher percentage of administrators who completed the 
survey than faculty and staff. Since administrators, faculty, and staff were not 
required to participate in the study, the voluntary nature of response resulted 
in limited responses by staff in particular and uneven responses by institution.  
3. The number of community colleges participating in this research study was 
larger than the number of public four-year colleges and universities. However, 
there are more community colleges in Missouri than public four-year 
institutions. 
4. The number of faculty who participated was much greater from community 
colleges than from four-year institutions. 
5. Some institutions either requested or volunteered to encourage participation in 
this study, while others did not. 
6. Although the pilot study did not indicate any confusion with the three FERPA 
questions, a few participants expressed concern about these questions after 
completing the survey. 
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7. This study was limited to Missouri colleges and universities. The results may 
not be indicative of the levels of planning or of the effectiveness of training in 
other states. 
Conclusions 
 Based on the major findings of this study, a number of conclusions can be drawn 
about the state of emergency preparedness of the public higher education institutions in 
Missouri. These conclusions are based on the data collected for this research study and 
due to response rates being low in some cases, conclusions about training may not be 
representative of all institutions across the state of Missouri.    
1. While most institutions have emergency management plans in place, these plans 
are not well read or understood. Overall, 18% percent of individuals who 
responded to this study were not even aware that their institution had an 
emergency management plan, and 38% of respondents admitted that they had not 
read their institution‟s plan. Many respondents also reported that their institution‟s 
plan included an active shooter or hostage situation when in actuality, this 
guidance was not provided. Individuals at three institutions reported the inclusion 
of an active shooter scenario incorrectly at percentages ranging from 64% to 80%. 
Respondents from eight institutions reported agreement of 43% to 70% that their 
plan included response to a hostage situation when it did not provide this 
guidance. 
2. Many emergency management plans are not comprehensive and are inconsistent 
across the state of Missouri. The researcher discovered that many types and sizes 
of plans exist in Missouri. Plans were as simple as a quick reference guide or 
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brochure and as detailed as a full-scale plan and ranged from one to over 40 
pages. The content related to campus violence also varied. Three emergency 
management plans, or 11%, did not include information on response to an active 
shooter situation, while 12 plans, or 44%, did not address a hostage situation.  
3. Minimal participation in annual training as part of emergency management 
planning occurs at our public higher education institutions in Missouri, especially 
for faculty. Thirty-five percent of respondents indicated participation in annual 
training related to campus violence incidents. Administrators reported the greatest 
participation in training at 58%, followed by staff at 50%, and faculty at 23%. 
Respondents also indicated that mandatory training is more likely to occur for 
full-time employees (administrators – 37%, staff – 27%, and faculty – 26%) as 
opposed to part-time employees (staff – 17%, faculty – 15%, student workers – 
14%).  
4. Participation in training does not indicate that an institution is better prepared to 
respond to campus safety incidents. The hypotheses in this study suggested that 
institutions with emergency management plans that include training would 
experience more consistency and accuracy of response to potential campus safety 
incidents as well as more knowledge of FERPA regulations. However, only one 
null hypothesis was rejected. Participation in training as part of an emergency 
management plan only affected the knowledge level of FERPA regulations by 
personnel in similar positions. Administrators participated in the most annual 
training related to campus violence incidents at 58% and indicated the greatest 
knowledge of FERPA regulations. Staff members reported the second highest 
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participation in annual training at 50% and also indicated the second greatest level 
of knowledge of FERPA regulations. Faculty members reported the least 
agreement that information may be released and also indicated the lowest level of 
participation in training at 23%.  
5. Employees do not understand what information may be shared under FERPA as 
well as what information is not subject to FERPA regulations. This study 
confirmed that personnel in higher education are reluctant to share information for 
fear that they will be violating student privacy regulations. Although updated 
FERPA regulations provide a greater degree of latitude for releasing confidential 
student information in the event that the health or safety of a student or other 
individuals is seriously compromised, respondents indicated a concern for 
releasing this information. Although limited, respondents were most comfortable 
sharing information with their colleagues, followed by Dave‟s parents, and then 
students.   
6. Some institutions, and some individuals, are hesitant to discuss or evaluate 
emergency preparedness in response to campus safety incidents. Four institutions 
declined to participate in this study, and one individual asked to be removed from 
the study. Upon receipt of the survey, a number of individuals immediately 
forwarded the survey to another employee who he/she believed would be more 
knowledgeable about campus safety. Additionally, the researcher was unable to 
obtain emergency management plans from two institutions. This resistance causes 
much concern in an era where emergency preparedness is imperative for all 
institutions of higher education. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
 During the course of analyzing the hypotheses specific to this study, the 
researcher discovered additional areas that would complement or further this research on 
the emergency preparedness of higher education institutions. Future researchers are 
encouraged to review these topics to provide additional insight and guidance into the 
increasingly important topic of emergency preparedness in higher education. Specific 
suggestions for additional research related to these hypotheses were included at the end 
of each hypothesis critique and listed a number of areas in which further research is 
needed to determine how college employees learn about crisis response. A number of 
other areas of needed research were also discovered and are reviewed below.   
1. With emergency management plans as varied and incomplete as many were found 
to be, additional research needs to examine why institutions that are aware that 
campus violence is a clear and present danger have chosen not to adequately 
prepare for such a crisis.    
2. A comprehensive review of the differences in emergency preparedness plans 
between two-year and four-year public institutions in Missouri could provide 
valuable research. There are significant differences between community colleges 
and four-year colleges and universities (i.e., admissions requirements, on-campus 
housing, large athletic programs, the pressures of upper division and graduate 
work) that could affect the preparedness level of these institutions, and it would 
be useful to know if these differences are reflected in their plans. 
3. A comparison of emergency preparedness planning between public and private 
higher education institutions in Missouri would also be useful. The nature of 
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public vs. private institutions could significantly impact the preparedness level of 
these institutions and what should be included in an effective plan. 
4. Colleges and universities increasingly rely on adjunct faculty to teach as well as 
part-time staff to provide service. However, these employees are transient, may 
only be employed temporarily, and may have the least knowledge of campus 
policies and procedures. A survey of these part-time faculty and staff may reveal 
valuable data on the preparedness level of these employees. 
5. Students are central to safety and security issues in higher education. Surveying 
students about how they would respond to potential incidents of campus violence 
could also provide useful research. The majority of community college students 
are transient, while students at four-year institutions are more likely to be 
residential. This variable could definitely impact the preparedness level of 
students by campus type and should be examined. 
6. All-hazards emergency management planning does not focus solely on campus 
violence. Additional research should focus on emergency preparedness for natural 
disasters, severe weather, or other types of all-hazards incidents. 
7. Since the FERPA questions caused some confusion for a few respondents, these 
questions could be rewritten and expanded on to conduct a more detailed review 
of the level of understanding of the nuances of FERPA. 
8. This study included only Missouri colleges and universities, where emergency 
management planning may not be indicative of what is happening elsewhere in 
the country. Similar studies should be conducted in other states to determine if 
emergency planning is similarly varied. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 This research has been critical in identifying the emergency preparedness levels 
of our public higher education institutions in Missouri. While the research showed that 
our institutions are prepared to respond to incidents of campus violence to greatly varying 
degrees, there are some fundamental steps that can be taken to increase the preparedness 
level of our colleges and universities. A set of best practices should be developed for 
emergency management plans. The Higher Education Subcommittee of the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council could assist in researching and developing these best 
practices. Additionally, statewide training exercises could assist with institutions being 
uniformly trained to respond to incidents of campus violence. The Higher Education 
Subcommittee could coordinate statewide training programs to assist our colleges and 
universities with emergency preparedness. These steps alone will assist our institutions in 
increasing their preparedness levels to respond to incidents of campus violence.   
 The researcher undertook this study fully expecting to find that both the 
comprehensiveness of plans, and the amount of training required by plans, would have a 
significant and measurable effect on how consistently and accurately employees 
responded to campus safety incidents. Surprisingly, neither was found to be the case. 
Despite low response rates from staff and uneven responses by institution, the researcher 
believes that emergency planners in the state would benefit from re-examining how plans 
are presented to employees, and how training occurs, to determine how emergency 
planning can be made more effective.  
The researcher also expected respondents to be much more knowledgeable about 
the provisions of FERPA. It was shocking that in these potential crisis situations, 
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individuals were reluctant to share information that could help protect the safety of their 
colleagues and students. With as much publicity as student privacy regulations have 
received over the past few years, the researcher fully believed that employee 
understanding of FERPA would have been greater.  
It was also disconcerting to learn that some colleges and a number of individuals 
did not care to discuss emergency preparedness. This hesitation seems unhealthy in an 
environment in which all employees should be fully aware of how both they and their 
institutions should respond to a campus crisis situation. Campuses must raise both the 
level of discussion and comfort with this topic if personnel are to be adequately prepared 
to respond.    
 On a positive note, individuals showed a surprising degree of intuitive 
understanding of how they should respond to a campus violence incident. This may 
suggest that there has been increased public awareness and consciousness that serves as 
universal training and could be used to enhance this knowledge. This study should be 
only the first of many steps to improve emergency preparedness for institutions of higher 
education in Missouri and across the United States.    
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APPENDIX A 
Campus Safety Survey  
 
Please complete this survey without referencing your institution's emergency 
management plan.  
 
Scenario #1: Dave, a student, brings a gun to school and is seen with the weapon on 
campus. As Brian, another student, is telling you that Dave has a gun, you hear 
what sounds like shots fired in an adjoining hallway in your building. 
 
I feel well prepared to respond to this situation. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
As soon as I hear shots fired, I would: 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Leave my 
office/classroom 
to see what was 
happening 
 
     
Lock my 
office/classroom 
door 
 
     
Call the 
Director of 
Public 
Safety/Chief  
of Police 
 
     
Call 911 
      
Alert the 
campus 
community  
that there is  
an armed person 
on campus 
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Do nothing 
      
 
If I learn that someone has been injured by the gunman, I would: 
 
 
Strongly  
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Assist the 
injured 
person 
 
     
Confront 
the gunman 
 
     
Call the 
Director of 
Public 
Safety/Chief 
of Police 
 
     
Call 911 
      
Alert the 
campus 
community 
that 
someone 
has been 
injured 
 
     
Do nothing 
      
 
When my institution is aware that there is a gunman on campus, my institution is 
responsible for: 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Notifying the 
campus 
community 
 
     
Calling 911 
      
Locking down 
the campus 
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Maintaining 
regular 
communication 
with the 
campus 
community 
 
     
 
When shots have been fired, my institution is responsible for: 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Notifying the 
campus 
community 
 
     
Calling 911 
      
Locking down 
the campus 
 
     
Maintaining 
regular 
communication 
with the 
campus 
community 
 
     
 
Scenario #2: Situation escalates. Dave takes a classroom of students and their 
instructor hostage. 
 
I feel well prepared to respond to this situation. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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If I were taken hostage, I would: 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Confront 
Dave 
physically 
 
     
Confront 
Dave 
verbally 
 
     
Try to 
establish a 
rapport with 
Dave 
 
     
Be 
observant  
of my 
surroundings 
 
     
 
When my institution becomes aware that there is a hostage situation on campus, my 
institution is responsible for: 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Notifying the 
campus 
community 
 
     
Calling 911 
      
Locking down 
the campus 
 
     
Maintaining 
regular 
communication 
with the 
campus 
community 
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Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) - Student Privacy Rights 
 
FERPA allows me to release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to his parents. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
FERPA allows me to release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to my colleagues. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
FERPA allows me to release information regarding Dave‟s behavior to students. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
General Questions Regarding Your Institution's Emergency Management Plan 
 
My institution has implemented an emergency management plan. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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I have read my institution‟s emergency management plan. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
My institution‟s emergency management plan addresses an active shooter situation. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
My institution‟s emergency management plan addresses a hostage situation. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
I was involved in the development of my institution‟s emergency management plan. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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I participate in training and/or drills related to campus violence (e.g., active shooter 
and/or hostage situation) at least annually as part of my institution‟s emergency 
management plan. 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
Participation in training and/or drills related to campus violence (e.g., active shooter 
and/or hostage situation) is mandatory for the following at my institution: 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Administrators 
      
Full-time 
faculty 
 
     
Part-time 
faculty 
 
     
Full-time staff 
      
Part-time staff 
      
Student 
workers 
 
     
 
Demographic Questions 
 
Position 
 
 
Classification 
 
 Administrator 
 Faculty 
 Staff 
 
 
 
148 
 
Are you the emergency management coordinator at your institution? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Are you employed at a two-year or four-year institution? 
 
 Two-year 
 Four-year 
 
At which institution are you employed? 
 
 Crowder College 
 East Central College 
 Jefferson College 
 Linn State Technical College 
 Metropolitan Community College-Blue River 
 Metropolitan Community College-Business and Technology 
 Metropolitan Community College-Longview 
 Metropolitan Community College-Maple Woods 
 Metropolitan Community College-Penn Valley 
 Mineral Area College 
 Missouri State University-West Plains 
 Moberly Area Community College 
 North Central Missouri College 
 Ozarks Technical Community College 
 St. Charles Community College 
 St. Louis Community College-Florissant Valley 
 St. Louis Community College-Forest Park 
 St. Louis Community College-Meramec 
 St. Louis Community College-Wildwood 
 State Fair Community College 
 Three Rivers Community College 
 Harris-Stowe State University 
 Lincoln University 
 Missouri Southern State University 
 Missouri State University 
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 Missouri University of Science and Technology 
 Missouri Western State University 
 Northwest Missouri State University 
 Southeast Missouri State University 
 Truman State University 
 University of Central Missouri 
 University of Missouri-Columbia 
 University of Missouri-St. Louis 
 University of Missouri-Kansas City 
 
Number of years in current position 
 
 
Number of years in profession 
 
 
What is the highest degree you have earned? 
 Associate's degree 
 Bachelor's degree 
 Master's degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 None 
 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Age 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Dear Respondent: 
I am a doctoral student in the College of Education at the University of Missouri-St. 
Louis under the advisement of Dr. Kent Farnsworth (farnsworthk@umsl.edu) and Dr. 
Lloyd Richardson (lloyd_richardson@umsl.edu) and need your assistance. I am 
conducting a research study on institutional preparedness for campus violence, in 
collaboration with the Commissioner of Higher Education and the Higher Education 
Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (see attached <a 
href="http://vega.jeffco.edu/register/kim/letter_of_support.pdf">letter of support</a>). 
The objective of this research is to attempt to understand the preparedness level of faculty 
and staff when responding to potential campus safety incidents. Through your 
participation, we hope to understand more about how emergency management planning 
and training affect the level of preparedness of faculty and staff, and how they can be 
made more effective. You have been selected to participate because of your role at the 
institution.  
  
Following is a link to a web-based survey. The survey provides two campus safety 
scenarios that I think you will find particularly interesting, followed by a series of 
questions related to personal and institutional responsibility, as well as knowledge of 
student privacy regulations. There are also questions related to emergency management 
planning and training at your institution. Additionally, there are a few demographic 
questions asked at the end of the survey. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes 
to complete. 
 
I will keep all data collected under lock and key. When the results of this survey are 
published or discussed with the Commissioner, the Higher Education Subcommittee, or 
at conferences, no identifying information will be included. If you choose to participate, 
you have the right not to answer any question(s) you do not want to answer. Your 
participation will constitute consent to have your responses used in my study in the 
aggregated form mentioned, and you may withdraw from participation in this study at 
any time.  
 
I hope you will take a few minutes to complete this survey. Each public two-year and 
four-year college and university in Missouri is involved, and full participation is needed 
to provide a complete picture of emergency readiness in the state. Campus violence is of 
growing concern to higher education institutions, and your participation will help identify 
the preparedness level of our institutions when responding to potential incidents of 
campus violence. 
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If you have any questions or concerns about completing the survey or participating in this 
study, you may contact me by phone at 636-797-3000, ext. 207, or by e-mail at 
kharvey@jeffco.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, 
you may contact the University of Missouri-St. Louis, Office of Research Administration 
by mail at 341 Woods Hall, One University Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, by 
phone at 314-516-5899, or by e-mail at ora@umsl.edu. 
Sincerely, 
Kimberly M. Harvey 
Registrar 
Jefferson College 
 
 
 
